|Bush Attack on Iran? and the election of 2008|
|PROGRESSIVE||REFERENCE||ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM*||RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM|
|Aung San Suu Kyi Martin Luther King go to nonviolence page NewsFollowUp.com|
|Iran-Syria Operations Group|
|PROGRESSIVE||REFERENCE||ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALISM*||RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM|
August 6, 2009 WayneMadsenReport
October 7, 2009 -- Do the CIA and Mossad have both sides of coin
covered in Iran?Recent reports that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
hails from a Persian Jewish family with the surname Sabourjian, which
translates from the "weaver of the sabour," sabour being the
Persian Jewish prayer shawl, has intelligence agents all over the Middle
East wondering if Ahmadinejad, with his bluster about there being no
Holocaust and his reviling of Zionism, is just not too good to be true for
those who want to attack Iran and overthrow the Islamic Republic.
Ahmadinejad's father, Ahmad, did change the family's name from Sabourjian to
Ahmadinejad, some say to hide the family's Jewish roots by adopting a Muslim
name. .... Of course, having Jewish
roots in no way makes Ahmadinejad some sort of secret agent for the Mossad.
However, the reports could undermine Ahmadinejad's standing among the more
radical members of the Iranian Islamic leadership.
... Ahmadinejad is linked politically to the Supreme
Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hoseyni Khamenei. However, according to an undated CIA
document titled "Recent Developments in Iran," that appears to be
from the time of the Iraq-Iran war of the 1980s, Khamenei is linked to the
group of mullahs that included Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ahmadinejad's losing
challenger in the recent Iranian presidential election. Mousavi served as
Prime Minister under then-President Khamenei in the 1980s. More
significantly, Mousavi, who received a great deal of financial support from
groups associated with George Soros and his CIA-linked
"foundations" during the recent presidential election campaign,
was part and parcel of the Iranian end of the Iran-contra affair. Mousavi
played a key role in freeing the American hostages in Lebanon in return for
secret U.S. military aid in Iran's war against the forces of Saddam Hussein,
who was also secretly backed by the Americans.
... Another member of the Khamenei bloc, according
to the CIA document, was Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, now the
Secretary General of the Combatant Clergy Association. Kani's colleague in
the bloc, according to the CIA document, was Ayatollah Abdul-Karim Mousavi
Ardabili, the head of the Iranian judiciary under Ayatollah Khomeini, who
was, along with Khamenei, Rafsanjani, and Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammad Hosseini
Beheshti, believed by many in Iran and abroad of having pre- and
post-revolution links to the CIA. Beheshti was killed, along with over 70
other members of his Islamic Republican Party on June 28, 1981 in a
terrorist bombing carried out by the neocon-supported Mohajedin-e-Khalq (MEK),
the favorrite Iranian terrorist group of Richard Perle and Michael Ledeen.
Beheshti was close to Mohamad Khatami, who would later become a moderate
president of Iran, and Khomeini. ... One
of Ledeen's associates, Manucher Ghorbanifar, an Iranian Jew who lived
mostly in Rome, was a key middleman in the supply of U.S. weapons to Iran in
the Iran-contra scandal. Ghorbanifar also became a key interlocutor in the
lead-up to the U.S. attack and occupation of Iraq and his involvement is
suspected in the forged Niger "yellowcake" uranium documents that
were partially used to justify the attack on Iraq.
... According to the CIA document, the Khamenei-Mousavi
bloc was oposed by the bloc of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former president
and, ironically, a backer of Mousavi in the recent election. Rafsanjani was
also a key player in the Iran-contra affair and is suspected of receiving
gifts from top Reagan administration officials in cementing the Iranian end
of the Iran-contra operational pipeline. Also associated with the Rafsanjani
bloc was Grand Ayatollah Hosein-Ali Montazeri, a once-powerful and quite
liberal mullah who was exiled to Qom and house arrest by Khamenei. Earlier,
Montazeri's chief aide, Mehdi Hashemi, was accused of leaking information on
Rafsanjani's connections to the Iran-contra scandal and he was executed as a
counter-revolutionary in 1987. ... It is
noteworthy that the CIA document states that the second,
Rafsanjani-Montazeri group had the "backing of fanatic terrorist
organizations." In fact, the more radical policies came out of the
first group that included Khamenei and the now-"moderate" Mousavi.
Nevertheless, from the Iran-contra scandal to the secret U.S. arming of
Iran, the CIA had its links to both blocs. The relationships built between
the CIA and the Khamenei-Mousavi and Rafsanjani blocs in the 1980s may
continue with the Khamenei-Ahmadinejad bloc today.
... Although the Mossad and CIA were heavily involved in
the secret Iran-contra arms shipments to Iran during the 1980s, the CIA
document also reveals that an Italian middleman named "Seratore"
was involved in secret negotiations to provide Iran with weapons, including
tanks from Argentina and armored personnel carriers from Italy.
The Big Picture From an authoritative source at the FED: QUOTE: The H.6 Release, Money Stock Measures, has never contained any information about the Federal Reserve's open market operations. The data on repurchase agreements contained in this release, which we will stop collecting and publishing on March 23, 2006, are the RPs that banks use to raise money from the public for their business activities.
Data on the repurchase agreements related to the Federal Reserve's open market operations are published on the H.4.1 Release, Factors Affecting Reserve Balances H.4.1 The current amount of outstanding repurchase agreements can be found on line 9 of the first page, and it is these amounts that show the RPs that the Federal Reserve has engaged in to add reserves to the banking system.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York, which actually conducts the open market operations, publishes extensive information and analysis of these operations on its website FRB NY (Open Market operations). On this page, the New York Fed provides a tool for the public to look up daily historical data on past operations and a link to an ftp site where the historical data are stored. The New York Fed also posts data on the current day's operation very shortly--often 5-10 minutes--after they occur DMM
|M3 consists of M2 plus (1) balances in institutional money market mutual funds; (2) large-denomination time deposits (time deposits in amounts of $100,000 or more); (3) repurchase agreement (RP) liabilities of depository institutions, in denominations of $100,000 or more, on U.S. government and federal agency securities; and (4) Eurodollars held by U.S. addressees at foreign branches of U.S. banks worldwide and at all banking offices in the United Kingdom and Canada. Large-denomination time deposits, RPs, and Eurodollars exclude those amounts held by depository institutions, the U.S. government, foreign banks and official institutions, and money market mutual funds. Seasonally adjusted M3 is constructed by summing institutional money funds, large-denomination time deposits, RPs, and Eurodollars, each adjusted separately, and adding this result to seasonally adjusted M2.|
|Dangerous Dual chain of command of nuclear weapons.|
|China and go to: NFU China page|
|Russia and go to NFU Russia Page|
|Iran and the dollar Explained below|
|Norwegian Oil Bourse|
|Dubai Mercantile Exchange|
The Euro 50 Group
Financial Institutions Research Site Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
|US Push For SWIFT Strangulation|
|ArabTimesOnline BRUSSELS, Feb 9, (Agen-cies): The organisation that facilitates the bulk of the world’s cross-border payments is facing growing US pressure to do what it has never done before — cut a country off from its global messaging system. Belgium-based SWIFT — the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telec-ommunication — is vital to international money flows, exchanging an average 18 million payment messages per day between banks and other financial institutions in 210 countries. The member-owned cooperative has been described as the ‘glue’ of the global banking system with the value of daily payments using SWIFT estimated at more than $6 trillion. You would struggle to find any bank or financial institution not connected to SWIFT. Non-financial users include General Electric, Google, Microsoft, Danone, Daimler and Sony. The United States is seeking tougher scrutiny of banking transactions and oil shipment financing with Iran, which it accuses of seeking to develop nuclear weapons. A US Senate Bill, if it becomes law, would direct the White House to press SWIFT to drop Iranian banks, and would give the Treasury Department the power to sanction SWIFT and the banks that own it. Nineteen banks and 25 connected institutions from Iran sent and received some 2 million messages in 2010. They included banks the US accuses of financing Iran’s nuclear programme or terrorism — Mellat, Post, Saderat and Sepah. Faced with outside pressure, SWIFT’s typical response has been: don’t shoot the messenger. The Belgium-based body, involved in 80 to 90 percent of all global payments, is keen to point out that it does not carry out transactions and is only a messaging system, more akin to a telephone service, which US lawmakers are not targeting. SWIFT does not hold accounts for members and does not perform clearing or settlement. “We are not a bank and do not hold funds. Our member banks are responsible for the content of these messages and complying with applicable financial sanctions; they are not monitored or controlled by SWIFT,” the cooperative said in an email exchange. However, it said last week that it was working with US and EU authorities to resolve the issue. “This is a complex situation,” it said, adding the impact on the global financial payments system and the flow of humanitarian aid to Iran required careful thought. SWIFT has faced tests of its independence before. After the United States and European Union had imposed sanctions on Myanmar in the 1990s over its human rights record, SWIFT faced NGO pressure to shut out the country’s banks. SWIFT’s response then as it is now was that it is just a common carrier. Subpoenas “At SWIFT I didn’t make the law. We just followed the law,” said Leonard Schrank, who was chief executive from 1992 to 2007. Over the years, SWIFT has faced various subpoenas to release information, but typically resisted, convincing investigators to target the responsible banks instead. That changed after the Sept 11 attacks in 2001. “Within days I got a call from the Treasury,” said Schrank. Within weeks, SWIFT set up an automated programme allowing US investigators to track the payments of suspected terrorists. Few people knew of the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program as it was subsequently called, until 2006 when The New York Times revealed its existence. It led to a wave of criticism from Europe about invasion of personal privacy. Europe is starting to pay attention this time too. No formal talks have begun, but EU governments have begun informal discussions on whether to include SWIFT in its own package of sanctions against Iran. Some are privately concerned that Washington could go as far as threatening SWIFT itself if it does not shut out Iran. “We are forced to look at it when Congress does because of the consequences,” said one senior EU diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. Some of those pushing for tougher measures against Iran point out that SWIFT’s rules allow it to expel users if they harm or threaten to harm the organisation’s reputation. It therefore has the power to act, they reason. The counter argument is that if SWIFT gives ground over Iran, it may well face calls to shut out other countries. China, for example, might want Taiwan excluded. SWIFT, a cooperative of more than 10,000 users and with a board including executives from Citi, UBS and Deutsche Bank, says it is aware of the gravity of the situation around Iran. “SWIFT is clearly concerned about setting a precedent here, but we’re looking at a Mideast war or worse. Hopefully they will find a solution, some way of ensuring this is just a one-off,” said Schrank. “Otherwise, SWIFT could get endlessly caught up in financial disputes as well.” Catastrophic Israel’s mounting speculation that Iran is moving closer to developing a nuclear weapon could have “catastrophic consequences”, a senior Russian foreign ministry official warned Thursday. “The inventions” concerning Iran’s nuclear programme “are increasing the tension and could encourage moves towards a military solution with catastrophic consequences,” Mikhail Ulyanov told the Interfax news agency. Speculation has risen in recent weeks, driven in part by comments made by Israeli officials, that the Jewish state may soon launch a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities to slow or halt its controversial programme. Israel and much of the international community believe that Iran’s nuclear enrichment programme masks a covert weapons drive, a charge Tehran denies. The “noise” about Iran’s nuclear intentions “has political and propaganda objectives which are far from being inoffensive,” said Ulyanov, head of the security and disarmament department in Russia’s foreign affairs ministry. Israeli Defence Minister Ehud Barak said last month that any decision by Israel on whether to attack Iran in a bid to halt its nuclear programme remained “very far away.” However Israel’s chief of military intelligence, General Aviv Kochavi, told a security conference last week that Iran had enough radioactive material to produce four nuclear bombs. And an expert on Israeli intelligence, Ronen Bergman, wrote in the New York Times last month that an Israeli attack could come this year. But Ulyanov said: “In our evaluations we prefer to be based on the actual facts, which are that Iran’s nuclear activity is under strict monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).” Reputation French President Nicolas Sarkozy put his reputation as a stalwart friend of Israel on the line Wednesday, warning that military action was no way to deal with nuclear-minded Iran at a dinner hosted by France’s main Jewish group — and his likely presidential election rival in the audience. In the wake of new US concerns that Israel might strike Iran’s nuclear facilities this spring, Sarkozy reiterated his ironclad commitment to Israel’s security but emphasized “the solution is never military.” “The solution is political, the solution is diplomatic, the solution is in sanctions,” Sarkozy said, referring to a string of UN sanctions over Iran’s nuclear program, which the West fears mask designs to build weapons. “We want the leaders of this country to understand that they have crossed a red line, and to reassure Israeli leaders so that the irreparable is not carried out,” Sarkozy said of possible military action. Tehran, whose Islamist leaders have called for Israel’s destruction, insists its nuclear program is peaceful and aimed at generating electricity and civilian-sector projects. Sarkozy said Israel needs a peaceful Palestinian state as its neighbor, and pointed to France’s historic rivalry with Germany — turned into a crucial European alliance today — as a possible model for Palestinians and Israelis. “France says: ‘Israeli people — perhaps more than another people — you can understand the need for the Palestinians to hope,’” said Sarkozy, adding that he wanted to see Israel one day “be loved, and not just feared.” Sarkozy said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, with whom he has had a fraught relationship at times, was known for “firmness ... someone who is firm must be open, because he doesn’t have to prove his firmness, and his strength.” The French leader also defended his decision to support Palestine’s membership in Paris-based UNESCO, the UN’s cultural arm, acknowledging that some in the crowd Wednesday were troubled by that. “If I did it, it’s exactly because my entire history has been to be close to Israel,” he said. Sarkozy’s comments came amid high-stakes French political drama as France’s best-known Jewish organization, CRIF, hosted the president and his most likely challenger in this spring’s election: Socialist Francois Hollande. The dinner that has become a must on France’s political calendar in recent years offered a rare glimpse of the two longtime rivals together in public and in a social setting with their often-testy political families. Hollande didn’t miss the chance to make his presence known even if the president got to make an address — and he did not. After Sarkozy’s speech, he got up from his table, crossed the ballroom and greeted the president — shaking hands with him and others at a vast table reserved for the Cabinet. They men bantered and joked as journalists’ cameras flashed.|
|Middle East Map|
|End of Dollar Hegemony TOP|
|The End of Dollar Hegemony|
|HON. RON PAUL OF TEXAS Before the U.S. House of
Posted Sunday, 26 February 2006 - Visit
Congressman Ron Paul's Web Site
February 15, 2006 The End of Dollar Hegemony
A hundred years ago it was called “dollar diplomacy.” After World War II, and especially after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989, that policy evolved into “dollar hegemony.” But after all these many years of great success, our dollar dominance is coming to an end.
It has been said, rightly, that he who holds the gold makes the rules. In earlier times it was readily accepted that fair and honest trade required an exchange for something of real value.
First it was simply barter of goods. Then it was discovered that gold held a universal attraction, and was a convenient substitute for more cumbersome barter transactions. Not only did gold facilitate exchange of goods and services, it served as a store of value for those who wanted to save for a rainy day.
Though money developed naturally in the marketplace, as governments grew in power they assumed monopoly control over money. Sometimes governments succeeded in guaranteeing the quality and purity of gold, but in time governments learned to outspend their revenues. New or higher taxes always incurred the disapproval of the people, so it wasn’t long before Kings and Caesars learned how to inflate their currencies by reducing the amount of gold in each coin-- always hoping their subjects wouldn’t discover the fraud. But the people always did, and they strenuously objected.
This helped pressure leaders to seek more gold by conquering other nations. The people became accustomed to living beyond their means, and enjoyed the circuses and bread. Financing extravagances by conquering foreign lands seemed a logical alternative to working harder and producing more. Besides, conquering nations not only brought home gold, they brought home slaves as well. Taxing the people in conquered territories also provided an incentive to build empires. This system of government worked well for a while, but the moral decline of the people led to an unwillingness to produce for themselves. There was a limit to the number of countries that could be sacked for their wealth, and this always brought empires to an end. When gold no longer could be obtained, their military might crumbled. In those days those who held the gold truly wrote the rules and lived well.
That general rule has held fast throughout the ages. When gold was used, and the rules protected honest commerce, productive nations thrived. Whenever wealthy nations-- those with powerful armies and gold-- strived only for empire and easy fortunes to support welfare at home, those nations failed.
Today the principles are the same, but the process is quite different. Gold no longer is the currency of the realm; paper is. The truth now is: “He who prints the money makes the rules”-- at least for the time being. Although gold is not used, the goals are the same: compel foreign countries to produce and subsidize the country with military superiority and control over the monetary printing presses.
Since printing paper money is nothing short of counterfeiting, the issuer of the international currency must always be the country with the military might to guarantee control over the system. This magnificent scheme seems the perfect system for obtaining perpetual wealth for the country that issues the de facto world currency. The one problem, however, is that such a system destroys the character of the counterfeiting nation’s people-- just as was the case when gold was the currency and it was obtained by conquering other nations. And this destroys the incentive to save and produce, while encouraging debt and runaway welfare.
The pressure at home to inflate the currency comes from the corporate welfare recipients, as well as those who demand handouts as compensation for their needs and perceived injuries by others. In both cases personal responsibility for one’s actions is rejected.
When paper money is rejected, or when gold runs out, wealth and political stability are lost. The country then must go from living beyond its means to living beneath its means, until the economic and political systems adjust to the new rules-- rules no longer written by those who ran the now defunct printing press.
“Dollar Diplomacy,” a policy instituted by William Howard Taft and his Secretary of State Philander C. Knox, was designed to enhance U.S. commercial investments in Latin America and the Far East. McKinley concocted a war against Spain in 1898, and (Teddy) Roosevelt’s corollary to the Monroe Doctrine preceded Taft’s aggressive approach to using the U.S. dollar and diplomatic influence to secure U.S. investments abroad. This earned the popular title of “Dollar Diplomacy.” The significance of Roosevelt’s change was that our intervention now could be justified by the mere “appearance” that a country of interest to us was politically or fiscally vulnerable to European control. Not only did we claim a right, but even an official U.S. government “obligation” to protect our commercial interests from Europeans.
This new policy came on the heels of the “gunboat” diplomacy of the late 19th century, and it meant we could buy influence before resorting to the threat of force. By the time the “dollar diplomacy” of William Howard Taft was clearly articulated, the seeds of American empire were planted. And they were destined to grow in the fertile political soil of a country that lost its love and respect for the republic bequeathed to us by the authors of the Constitution. And indeed they did. It wasn’t too long before dollar “diplomacy” became dollar “hegemony” in the second half of the 20th century.
This transition only could have occurred with a dramatic change in monetary policy and the nature of the dollar itself.
Congress created the Federal Reserve System in 1913. Between then and 1971 the principle of sound money was systematically undermined. Between 1913 and 1971, the Federal Reserve found it much easier to expand the money supply at will for financing war or manipulating the economy with little resistance from Congress-- while benefiting the special interests that influence government.
Dollar dominance got a huge boost after World War II. We were spared the destruction that so many other nations suffered, and our coffers were filled with the world’s gold. But the world chose not to return to the discipline of the gold standard, and the politicians applauded. Printing money to pay the bills was a lot more popular than taxing or restraining unnecessary spending. In spite of the short-term benefits, imbalances were institutionalized for decades to come.
The 1944 Bretton Woods agreement solidified the dollar as the preeminent world reserve currency, replacing the British pound. Due to our political and military muscle, and because we had a huge amount of physical gold, the world readily accepted our dollar (defined as 1/35th of an ounce of gold) as the world’s reserve currency. The dollar was said to be “as good as gold,” and convertible to all foreign central banks at that rate. For American citizens, however, it remained illegal to own. This was a gold-exchange standard that from inception was doomed to fail.
The U.S. did exactly what many predicted she would do. She printed more dollars for which there was no gold backing. But the world was content to accept those dollars for more than 25 years with little question-- until the French and others in the late 1960s demanded we fulfill our promise to pay one ounce of gold for each $35 they delivered to the U.S. Treasury. This resulted in a huge gold drain that brought an end to a very poorly devised pseudo-gold standard.
It all ended on August 15, 1971, when Nixon closed the gold window and refused to pay out any of our remaining 280 million ounces of gold. In essence, we declared our insolvency and everyone recognized some other monetary system had to be devised in order to bring stability to the markets.
Amazingly, a new system was devised which allowed the U.S. to operate the printing presses for the world reserve currency with no restraints placed on it-- not even a pretense of gold convertibility, none whatsoever! Though the new policy was even more deeply flawed, it nevertheless opened the door for dollar hegemony to spread.
Realizing the world was embarking on something new and mind boggling, elite money managers, with especially strong support from U.S. authorities, struck an agreement with OPEC to price oil in U.S. dollars exclusively for all worldwide transactions. This gave the dollar a special place among world currencies and in essence “backed” the dollar with oil. In return, the U.S. promised to protect the various oil-rich kingdoms in the Persian Gulf against threat of invasion or domestic coup. This arrangement helped ignite the radical Islamic movement among those who resented our influence in the region. The arrangement gave the dollar artificial strength, with tremendous financial benefits for the United States. It allowed us to export our monetary inflation by buying oil and other goods at a great discount as dollar influence flourished.
This post-Bretton Woods system was much more fragile than the system that existed between 1945 and 1971. Though the dollar/oil arrangement was helpful, it was not nearly as stable as the pseudo gold standard under Bretton Woods. It certainly was less stable than the gold standard of the late 19th century.
During the 1970s the dollar nearly collapsed, as oil prices surged and gold skyrocketed to $800 an ounce. By 1979 interest rates of 21% were required to rescue the system. The pressure on the dollar in the 1970s, in spite of the benefits accrued to it, reflected reckless budget deficits and monetary inflation during the 1960s. The markets were not fooled by LBJ’s claim that we could afford both “guns and butter.”
Once again the dollar was rescued, and this ushered in the age of true dollar hegemony lasting from the early 1980s to the present. With tremendous cooperation coming from the central banks and international commercial banks, the dollar was accepted as if it were gold.
Fed Chair Alan Greenspan, on several occasions before the House Banking Committee, answered my challenges to him about his previously held favorable views on gold by claiming that he and other central bankers had gotten paper money-- i.e. the dollar system-- to respond as if it were gold. Each time I strongly disagreed, and pointed out that if they had achieved such a feat they would have defied centuries of economic history regarding the need for money to be something of real value. He smugly and confidently concurred with this.
In recent years central banks and various financial institutions, all with vested interests in maintaining a workable fiat dollar standard, were not secretive about selling and loaning large amounts of gold to the market even while decreasing gold prices raised serious questions about the wisdom of such a policy. They never admitted to gold price fixing, but the evidence is abundant that they believed if the gold price fell it would convey a sense of confidence to the market, confidence that they indeed had achieved amazing success in turning paper into gold.
Increasing gold prices historically are viewed as an indicator of distrust in paper currency. This recent effort was not a whole lot different than the U.S. Treasury selling gold at $35 an ounce in the 1960s, in an attempt to convince the world the dollar was sound and as good as gold. Even during the Depression, one of Roosevelt’s first acts was to remove free market gold pricing as an indication of a flawed monetary system by making it illegal for American citizens to own gold. Economic law eventually limited that effort, as it did in the early 1970s when our Treasury and the IMF tried to fix the price of gold by dumping tons into the market to dampen the enthusiasm of those seeking a safe haven for a falling dollar after gold ownership was re-legalized.
Once again the effort between 1980 and 2000 to fool the market as to the true value of the dollar proved unsuccessful. In the past 5 years the dollar has been devalued in terms of gold by more than 50%. You just can’t fool all the people all the time, even with the power of the mighty printing press and money creating system of the Federal Reserve.
Even with all the shortcomings of the fiat monetary system, dollar influence thrived. The results seemed beneficial, but gross distortions built into the system remained. And true to form, Washington politicians are only too anxious to solve the problems cropping up with window dressing, while failing to understand and deal with the underlying flawed policy. Protectionism, fixing exchange rates, punitive tariffs, politically motivated sanctions, corporate subsidies, international trade management, price controls, interest rate and wage controls, super-nationalist sentiments, threats of force, and even war are resorted to—all to solve the problems artificially created by deeply flawed monetary and economic systems.
In the short run, the issuer of a fiat reserve currency can accrue great economic benefits. In the long run, it poses a threat to the country issuing the world currency. In this case that’s the United States. As long as foreign countries take our dollars in return for real goods, we come out ahead. This is a benefit many in Congress fail to recognize, as they bash China for maintaining a positive trade balance with us. But this leads to a loss of manufacturing jobs to overseas markets, as we become more dependent on others and less self-sufficient. Foreign countries accumulate our dollars due to their high savings rates, and graciously loan them back to us at low interest rates to finance our excessive consumption.
It sounds like a great deal for everyone, except the time will come when our dollars-- due to their depreciation-- will be received less enthusiastically or even be rejected by foreign countries. That could create a whole new ballgame and force us to pay a price for living beyond our means and our production. The shift in sentiment regarding the dollar has already started, but the worst is yet to come.
The agreement with OPEC in the 1970s to price oil in dollars has provided tremendous artificial strength to the dollar as the preeminent reserve currency. This has created a universal demand for the dollar, and soaks up the huge number of new dollars generated each year. Last year alone M3 increased over $700 billion.
The artificial demand for our dollar, along with our military might, places us in the unique position to “rule” the world without productive work or savings, and without limits on consumer spending or deficits. The problem is, it can’t last.
Price inflation is raising its ugly head, and the NASDAQ bubble-- generated by easy money-- has burst. The housing bubble likewise created is deflating. Gold prices have doubled, and federal spending is out of sight with zero political will to rein it in. The trade deficit last year was over $728 billion. A $2 trillion war is raging, and plans are being laid to expand the war into Iran and possibly Syria. The only restraining force will be the world’s rejection of the dollar. It’s bound to come and create conditions worse than 1979-1980, which required 21% interest rates to correct. But everything possible will be done to protect the dollar in the meantime. We have a shared interest with those who hold our dollars to keep the whole charade going.
Greenspan, in his first speech after leaving the Fed, said that gold prices were up because of concern about terrorism, and not because of monetary concerns or because he created too many dollars during his tenure. Gold has to be discredited and the dollar propped up. Even when the dollar comes under serious attack by market forces, the central banks and the IMF surely will do everything conceivable to soak up the dollars in hope of restoring stability. Eventually they will fail.
Most importantly, the dollar/oil relationship has to be maintained to keep the dollar as a preeminent currency. Any attack on this relationship will be forcefully challenged—as it already has been.
In November 2000 Saddam Hussein demanded Euros for his oil. His arrogance was a threat to the dollar; his lack of any military might was never a threat. At the first cabinet meeting with the new administration in 2001, as reported by Treasury Secretary Paul O’Neill, the major topic was how we would get rid of Saddam Hussein-- though there was no evidence whatsoever he posed a threat to us. This deep concern for Saddam Hussein surprised and shocked O’Neill.
It now is common knowledge that the immediate reaction of the administration after 9/11 revolved around how they could connect Saddam Hussein to the attacks, to justify an invasion and overthrow of his government. Even with no evidence of any connection to 9/11, or evidence of weapons of mass destruction, public and congressional support was generated through distortions and flat out misrepresentation of the facts to justify overthrowing Saddam Hussein.
There was no public talk of removing Saddam Hussein because of his attack on the integrity of the dollar as a reserve currency by selling oil in Euros. Many believe this was the real reason for our obsession with Iraq. I doubt it was the only reason, but it may well have played a significant role in our motivation to wage war. Within a very short period after the military victory, all Iraqi oil sales were carried out in dollars. The Euro was abandoned.
In 2001, Venezuela’s ambassador to Russia spoke of Venezuela switching to the Euro for all their oil sales. Within a year there was a coup attempt against Chavez, reportedly with assistance from our CIA.
After these attempts to nudge the Euro toward replacing the dollar as the world’s reserve currency were met with resistance, the sharp fall of the dollar against the Euro was reversed. These events may well have played a significant role in maintaining dollar dominance.
It’s become clear the U.S. administration was sympathetic to those who plotted the overthrow of Chavez, and was embarrassed by its failure. The fact that Chavez was democratically elected had little influence on which side we supported.
Now, a new attempt is being made against the petrodollar system. Iran, another member of the “axis of evil,” has announced her plans to initiate an oil bourse in March of this year. Guess what, the oil sales will be priced Euros, not dollars.
Most Americans forget how our policies have systematically and needlessly antagonized the Iranians over the years. In 1953 the CIA helped overthrow a democratically elected president, Mohammed Mossadeqh, and install the authoritarian Shah, who was friendly to the U.S. The Iranians were still fuming over this when the hostages were seized in 1979. Our alliance with Saddam Hussein in his invasion of Iran in the early 1980s did not help matters, and obviously did not do much for our relationship with Saddam Hussein. The administration announcement in 2001 that Iran was part of the axis of evil didn’t do much to improve the diplomatic relationship between our two countries. Recent threats over nuclear power, while ignoring the fact that they are surrounded by countries with nuclear weapons, doesn’t seem to register with those who continue to provoke Iran. With what most Muslims perceive as our war against Islam, and this recent history, there’s little wonder why Iran might choose to harm America by undermining the dollar. Iran, like Iraq, has zero capability to attack us. But that didn’t stop us from turning Saddam Hussein into a modern day Hitler ready to take over the world. Now Iran, especially since she’s made plans for pricing oil in Euros, has been on the receiving end of a propaganda war not unlike that waged against Iraq before our invasion.
It’s not likely that maintaining dollar supremacy was the only motivating factor for the war against Iraq, nor for agitating against Iran. Though the real reasons for going to war are complex, we now know the reasons given before the war started, like the presence of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam Hussein’s connection to 9/11, were false. The dollar’s importance is obvious, but this does not diminish the influence of the distinct plans laid out years ago by the neo-conservatives to remake the Middle East. Israel’s influence, as well as that of the Christian Zionists, likewise played a role in prosecuting this war. Protecting “our” oil supplies has influenced our Middle East policy for decades.
But the truth is that paying the bills for this aggressive intervention is impossible the old fashioned way, with more taxes, more savings, and more production by the American people. Much of the expense of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 was shouldered by many of our willing allies. That’s not so today. Now, more than ever, the dollar hegemony-- it’s dominance as the world reserve currency-- is required to finance our huge war expenditures. This $2 trillion never-ending war must be paid for, one way or another. Dollar hegemony provides the vehicle to do just that.
For the most part the true victims aren’t aware of how they pay the bills. The license to create money out of thin air allows the bills to be paid through price inflation. American citizens, as well as average citizens of Japan, China, and other countries suffer from price inflation, which represents the “tax” that pays the bills for our military adventures. That is until the fraud is discovered, and the foreign producers decide not to take dollars nor hold them very long in payment for their goods. Everything possible is done to prevent the fraud of the monetary system from being exposed to the masses who suffer from it. If oil markets replace dollars with Euros, it would in time curtail our ability to continue to print, without restraint, the world’s reserve currency.
It is an unbelievable benefit to us to import valuable goods and export depreciating dollars. The exporting countries have become addicted to our purchases for their economic growth. This dependency makes them allies in continuing the fraud, and their participation keeps the dollar’s value artificially high. If this system were workable long term, American citizens would never have to work again. We too could enjoy “bread and circuses” just as the Romans did, but their gold finally ran out and the inability of Rome to continue to plunder conquered nations brought an end to her empire.
The same thing will happen to us if we don’t change our ways. Though we don’t occupy foreign countries to directly plunder, we nevertheless have spread our troops across 130 nations of the world. Our intense effort to spread our power in the oil-rich Middle East is not a coincidence. But unlike the old days, we don’t declare direct ownership of the natural resources-- we just insist that we can buy what we want and pay for it with our paper money. Any country that challenges our authority does so at great risk.
Once again Congress has bought into the war propaganda against Iran, just as it did against Iraq. Arguments are now made for attacking Iran economically, and militarily if necessary. These arguments are all based on the same false reasons given for the ill-fated and costly occupation of Iraq.
Our whole economic system depends on continuing the current monetary arrangement, which means recycling the dollar is crucial. Currently, we borrow over $700 billion every year from our gracious benefactors, who work hard and take our paper for their goods. Then we borrow all the money we need to secure the empire (DOD budget $450 billion) plus more. The military might we enjoy becomes the “backing” of our currency. There are no other countries that can challenge our military superiority, and therefore they have little choice but to accept the dollars we declare are today’s “gold.” This is why countries that challenge the system-- like Iraq, Iran and Venezuela-- become targets of our plans for regime change.
Ironically, dollar superiority depends on our strong military, and our strong military depends on the dollar. As long as foreign recipients take our dollars for real goods and are willing to finance our extravagant consumption and militarism, the status quo will continue regardless of how huge our foreign debt and current account deficit become.
But real threats come from our political adversaries who are incapable of confronting us militarily, yet are not bashful about confronting us economically. That’s why we see the new challenge from Iran being taken so seriously. The urgent arguments about Iran posing a military threat to the security of the United States are no more plausible than the false charges levied against Iraq. Yet there is no effort to resist this march to confrontation by those who grandstand for political reasons against the Iraq war.
It seems that the people and Congress are easily persuaded by the jingoism of the preemptive war promoters. It’s only after the cost in human life and dollars are tallied up that the people object to unwise militarism.
The strange thing is that the failure in Iraq is now apparent to a large majority of American people, yet they and Congress are acquiescing to the call for a needless and dangerous confrontation with Iran.
But then again, our failure to find Osama bin Laden and destroy his network did not dissuade us from taking on the Iraqis in a war totally unrelated to 9/11.
Concern for pricing oil only in dollars helps explain our willingness to drop everything and teach Saddam Hussein a lesson for his defiance in demanding Euros for oil.
And once again there’s this urgent call for sanctions and threats of force against Iran at the precise time Iran is opening a new oil exchange with all transactions in Euros.
Using force to compel people to accept money without real value can only work in the short run. It ultimately leads to economic dislocation, both domestic and international, and always ends with a price to be paid.
The economic law that honest exchange demands only things of real value as currency cannot be repealed. The chaos that one day will ensue from our 35-year experiment with worldwide fiat money will require a return to money of real value. We will know that day is approaching when oil-producing countries demand gold, or its equivalent, for their oil rather than dollars or Euros. The sooner the better.
|US-IRAN: Raid on nuclear fuel market firstname.lastname@example.org|
US-IRAN: Raid on nuclear fuel market. by Rudo de Ruijter, independent
researcher. 2 May 2006
In the background of the political joust about Iran, a few countries are reshaping the world. They are taking possession of the global nuclear fuel market. New IAEA regulations should keep newcomers away. The US, UK, France, Germany, Russia, China and Japan will become world’s nuclear filling stations. Under the auspices of the IAEA these suppliers will dictate the rules, the prices and the currencies they want to get paid in. Iran has become the pretext and test case for their plans. The problems of tomorrow’s world economy are being shaped today.
Iran and the Non-Proliferation Treaty Iran’s nuclear history From shah Reza to Khomeini The accusations against Iran: 130 Grams of uranium US’ agenda: The oil, the dollar and the foreign debt… Seeking allies The strange European delegation Russia and China Is enrichment in non-nuclear-weapon states dangerous? Birth of a new world order Questionable elements The UN theatre
Iran and the Non-Proliferation Treaty
US President Bush wants us to believe that Iran has plans for nuclear weapons. Well, we remember, that in 2002 he accused Iraq of having weapons of mass destruction. That turned out to be a lie, so let us look more closely at the facts.
Iran is a member state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) from the very first moment in 1968.  The NPT is a treaty not only to stop proliferation of nuclear arms, but also to help each other to develop civil nuclear energy.  In the treaty, the nuclear-weapon states (US, Russia, China, France and England) promised nuclear disarmament. (So far, they have not kept their promises.) The other members had to sign agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), NPT’s watchdog, for the implementation of controls. IAEA’s agreement with Iran entered into force on May 15 1974. 
Iran’s nuclear history
At that time shah Reza ruled Iran. Thanks to the Anglo-US’ operation Ajax in 1953 he was still on the throne. From 1957 Shah Reza wanted to develop nuclear energy in Iran.  The US offered all the help and stuff he wanted: a research reactor, enriched uranium and plutonium. The research reactor was started in 1967, but went critical soon after. Then the French became good friends too. They promised to repair the reactor. The shah made a $ 1 billion loan to the French for the construction of an enrichment plant in Tricastin in the South of France. From 1974 still more countries offered their services to the shah. Agreements followed for five reactors and fuel from France, two reactors and fuel from the US, regular purchases of uranium from Australia and two reactors from West Germany. Denmark delivered 10 kilo of highly enriched uranium and 25 kilo of natural uranium. Technical staff came in from Argentina and India, while Iranian students went to UK and West Germany. Discussions took place with Pakistan and Turkey for regional nuclear cooperation. The Iranian budget for the atomic energy rose from $ 30 million in 1975 to $ 1 billion the following year, and still more reactors were ordered from the US. By the end of 1978, with not a single reactor completed yet, the shah ran out of money. Meanwhile, popular opposition against the shah’s blood shedding oppression rose to a climax.
From shah Reza to Khomeini
The opposition against the shah had grown since 1953, when popular hero and Prime Minister Mossadeq had been overthrown by a joint coup of the CIA, the English and the shah.  Mossadeq had successfully strived to nationalize the Anglo Iranian Oil Company (BP). Sued by England, Mossadeq had won the case at the International Court in The Hague.  During the coup, the shah initially fled the country, but came back after the army had succeeded to beat down the protests of the population. In 1960, to please his American friends, he granted diplomatic immunity to all US’ personnel working in Iran. A young opponent, called Ruhollah Khomeini dared to criticize the shah publicly. The first time he was jailed and recidivist a few years later he was expelled. The shah’s oppression increased over time. In riots many hundreds of opponents were killed and thousands injured. By 1977 all opposition movements finally united and in January 1979 the shah definitely fled the country. Khomeini returned to Iran in triumph and on April 1st 1979 the Islamic Republic of Iran was established by referendum. In November 1979, when Iranian students heard that the shah had gone to the US, they stormed the US embassy in Tehran to claim the extradition of the shah in order to summon him to trial. A long hostages crisis followed. A US’ attempt to free them failed. President Saddam Hussein of Iraq, a good friend of the US at that time, invaded Iran, announcing he would be in Tehran within three days. However, the war between Iraq and Iran would last 10 years and cost hundreds of thousands of lifes. With the end of the Warschau Pact in 1989 and Saddam’s mistake to invade Kuwait, the US attitude toward Iraq made a 180-degree turn. Iraq and Iran were both US’ enemies now. But since these countries detain 10.5 and 10 percent of world’s oil reserves respectively and the US is world’s biggest consumer (with 25 percent of world’s oil production), it was foreseeable the US would not just ignore these countries. The US now has less than 2 percent of world’s oil reserves. Its dependency on foreign oil is rapidly increasing and, according to Bush, 60 percent today. 
The accusations against Iran: 130 Grams of Uranium
On June 16 2003 the International Atomic Energy Agency announced, that Iran had not reported a uranium import of 1991 and the subsequent stocking and processing. That is true. But from a confidential IAEA document of June 6 2003 we learn, that this import contained just 130 gram of uranium.  According to article 37 of the official agreement between the IAEA and Iran, in force since May 15 1974, nuclear materials containing less than 1 kilo of uranium are exempted from the IAEA safeguards.  The IAEA accusations made the world believe that Iran had transgressed the rules.
Similar jousts are about the Additional Protocol. During the embargo against Iraq, when proof had to be found of weapons of mass destruction and Saddam was not willing to grant more rights to the UN inspectors, the IAEA had developed additional rules to make controls easier. The new rules also make it easier to discriminate among members: excessive rules for one country, friendly rules for others. In June 2003 only 33 of the 188 members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty had accepted to sign the Additional Protocol. Nevertheless the US and a delegation of the European Union formed by France, Germany and the United Kingdom, wanted to force Iran to sign the Additional Protocol. In exchange, the three European countries (E3) promised to come up with interesting commercial deals. Iran was willing to hear what they had to propose. This is not so surprising. 30 percent of Iran’s oil goes to Europe and 40 percent of its imports come from Europe. Spring 2003, Iran had even switched its oil sales from dollars to euros, which is good for Europe and bad for the US, since it weakens the dollar. During the talks about new commercial deals with the Europeans Iran voluntarily agreed to suspend its research program for uranium enrichment and to grant additional rights to the IAEA for extended checking of their nuclear facilities. After repeated Iranian requests it became clear, that the E3 countries did not intend to deliver the promised deals. They just wanted to keep the talks going on indefinitely, meantime preventing Iran from enriching uranium. Iran resumed its program and re-established the contractual conditions for the IAEA controls. This resulted in the attempt of the US and E3 to have the UN Security Council condemn Iran.
US’ agenda: The oil, the dollar and the foreign debt…
So, if the so-called proofs against Iran appear to be fabricated, what is the real issue? I think the general idea is clear to all. With its excessive energy consumption the US thinks, it is necessary to have pro-US governments in Iraq, Iran and, for the UNOCAL pipeline project, also in Afghanistan. During the Cold War Saddam Hussein in Iraq and shah Reza in Iran were useful US’ allies, but these days are over. Thanks to Bush we now have wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Iran is located in between. Considering the reputation the US has built up in Iran a spontaneous arising of a pro-US government is not likely to happen soon.
The second thing that explains more immediately Bush aggressive stance against Iran is its part in the weakening dollar. A new Iranian oil bourse, if successful, may even trip up US’ hegemony. 
In a glance, this is how it works. World’s oil and gas is traded in US-dollars. Since 1971 the US has had the advantage to be the petrodollar supplier of the world. Supplying dollars to foreign countries means, the US can print money and purchase goods, services and investments with it. Since the foreigners need these dollars to buy oil, and keep them also in use in the international trade outside the US, the US has never had to deliver anything in return. Merely supplying money means free shopping. This is how US’ foreign debt grew to 3,200,000,000,000 dollars today. And if some day the world gets tired of the abuse and does not want US-dollars anymore, their massive offers of dollars on the exchange markets would immediately push the exchange rate down, the dollar would become worth next to nothing and the foreign debt would vanish. So it is very advantageous to deliver currencies that are permanently needed and wanted abroad.
But with today’s’ sky rocketing debt, the dollar has become vulnerable. When Saddam Hussein switched to the euro on November 6 2000 [11, 12], the exchange markets were temporarily overflowed by dollars. With Iran considering a similar switch since 1999 and maybe more OPEC countries to follow , speculations and decreasing trust set in motion a long and continuous descent of the dollar, which risked leading to its collapse.  By the end of 2002 the dollar rate had fallen 18 percent.  This probably explains, why the US could not wait and on March 20 2003 even overruled the UN Security Council to invade Iraq. The Iraqi oil trade has been switched back to dollars on June 6 2003.  From spring 2003, Iran also switched to the euro, and during the two years that followed the dollar rate lost another 12 percent.
The US free shopping advantage only works insofar foreign countries need additional dollars. So, each time when oil prices rise on US controlled International Petroleum Exchange (IPE) of London and New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX), more dollars are needed in the world.  As 85 percent of the oil trade takes place outside the US, for each extra dollar needed inside the US, seven dollars are needed outside and result in free shopping. To increase the foreign dollar demand still further, the US Federal Reserve sells Treasury Bonds to foreigners, which reduces the amount of dollars abroad. This increases foreign demand for dollars and raises the exchange rate. To stop the exchange rate from rising continually, new dollars have to be “delivered” to the foreigners, resulting again in free shopping. If the US wants to lower the dollar rate it can just import more. In fact, as long as world demand for dollars keeps growing, the US can decide itself about the rate of their currency and enjoy free shopping. For the year 2004, the latter represented an advantage of 3,000 dollar per US’ inhabitant. Recently, foreigners are not so willing anymore to fuel US’ fairy credit carrousel. The US tries to seduce them with higher interests, but foreign demand for bonds stays insufficient. The only remaining way to obtain enough new credit is to increase world’s demand for dollars by making the oil prices rise on IPE and NYMEX. And that is what is happening since mid 2004.
Here, once again, an Iranian initiative endangers US’ credit carrousel. Iran wants to establish an independent non-dollar oil bourse. Assuming it succeeds in creating enough trade to establish a recognized world oil price, and assuming they keep the price stable, oil prices on IPE and NYMEX cannot rise freely anymore. The credit carrousel may stop. The Iranian Oil Bourse will not only reduce the power of IPE and NYMEX, it will also have its influence on the exchange rate between dollars and euros. If oil gets cheaper in euros, there will be a rush on euros. And vice versa. The US and EU both see this bourse as a risk. The opening of the Iranian Oil Bourse had been scheduled for March 20 2006, the Iranian New Year. It is now announced for the first week of May 2006. 
To take measures against Iran the US needs allies. Allies are useful for cost sharing of operations and to let them clean up the mess, as in Afghanistan and Iraq. The best way to gain allies is to have your enemies condemned by a UN Security Council resolution. That means the US has to convince the other veto-holding countries. Of course, that would not work, if the US disclosed its real reasons. The US had to come up with something better, which could unite and reward all of the veto-countries. Well, veto-countries are the victor states of the Second World War. They happen to have in common to be nuclear weapon states, all disposing of uranium enrichment facilities. So how about a project to reward them with the exclusive rights for uranium enrichment and for the supply of nuclear fuel to the non-nuclear-weapon states? 
The strange European delegation
Then, in the diplomatic stage-play about Iran, Bush is joint by the UK, France and Germany, the so-called E3. They would represent the European Union. This strange composition of an EU-delegation starts to make sense, when we notice that these countries are the European countries possessing enrichment facilities. Camouflaged under the flag of the European Union they have their own special interest in enrichment and reprocessing.
How European are these E3 countries? In fact, as European representatives, France and Germany make a strange case in willing to get their trade partner Iran condemned by the UN Security Council. It indicates they are playing poker for high stakes. They deliberately risk disrupting an Iranian oil market priced in euros, either through a direct conflict against Iran or by allowing the US to obtain an embargo.
Bush, if he does not obtain his embargo, would probably not even mind to see the Iranian power plants under construction bombed once again, to make Iran consume its oil, instead of selling it in euros. And what role does the UK play in this EU-delegation? Well, with its IPE oil market always playing in symbiosis with NYMEX, and its subsequent impossibility to adopt the euro, they serve as the messenger-boy of the White House. As usual.
The tone of the E3 talks with Iran is not the one you would normally expect between trade partners who wish to improve their relations. The reports about the discussions are long litanies of obligations the E3 seeks to impose to Iran. Iran is treated like the naughty schoolboy, who will have to obey one way or the other.  In January 2006, French President Chirac even covertly threatened with a possible nuclear attack. Of course such an attitude can only be counter-productive.
Russia and China
To reach a Security Council resolution with sanctions against Iran the US, France, UK and Germany have to convince Russia and China not to use their right of veto. Since Russia and China are enrichment countries too, that seemed easy, but failed until now. Russia and China do not want any armed intervention against Iran. Russia still bears the scars of the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986, with hundreds of thousands of irradiated citizens, new generations with genetic deformations, and unsolved plutonium radiation problems for hundreds of centuries to come. It has not build any new reactors since then. Russia has a more shaded view on world’s nuclear future. Besides, it still has fossil energy sources. China has good relations with Iran for the supply of oil and gas during the coming decades. If it wants to let Iran down, it would have to foresee alternatives for their high needs of energy. Besides, China does not seem to share the aggressive stance of the US and the E3.
Is enrichment in non-nuclear-weapon states dangerous?
Natural uranium contains 0.7 percent of U-235 atoms, against 99.3 percent of mostly U-238 atoms. To use it as nuclear fuel the proportion of U-235 atoms has to be increased to 3 to 5 percent. To do so, the uranium must first be purified and converted into a gas. In this form batteries of centrifuges can filter out a few of the heavier U-238 atoms in a long and energy swallowing process. Risks in the enrichment process are those of the chemical industries and not so much the low radiation. This uranium is not suitable to make bombs. For bombs you need a degree of enrichment of at least 90 percent.  If a country, as for instance Iran, decided to develop such highly enriched uranium, it could take 3 to 5 years to produce sufficiently for a bomb. Besides, according to scientists, for high enrichment much larger centrifuge facilities are used. The oft-repeated but mistaken belief, that one could fabricate unnoticed highly enriched uranium in a civil nuclear plant, now serves Bush’ contention that enrichment should remain in the hands of world’s nuclear-weapon states.
Birth of a new world order
The idea of limiting enrichment capability to the nations that already have it is not entirely new. The accusations against Iran, the successful misleading of journalists, politicians and diplomats had created the ideal circumstances to speed up its realization. The idea appeared in a UN brochure in 2004.  Then it was still in the form of a call for a voluntary and time-limited moratorium on the construction of new facilities for enrichment and reprocessing. In February 2005 the United Nations further elaborated the idea as the Multilateral Nuclear Approach (MNA) . Already in April 2005 Ambassador Kenzo Oshima of Japan’s mission to the UN put the question, “if the MNA would not not unduly affect the peaceful use of nuclear energy by those non-nuclear-weapon states that carry out nuclear activities in faithful and transparent compliance with their NPT obligations.”
On February 6 2006 the US’ Department of Energy announced its version of the idea in their plan for the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). The following day, at the Oarai Conference in Japan, this GNEP is presented as an idea of IAEA’s head ElBaradei and a proposal of Bush.  And, of course, such a supreme idea should not lack of glamour. So, a few days later, DOE compliments itself as follows: “Finally, the partnership arrangement between fuel-cycle and reactor-only states envisioned by GNEP will help supply the world with clean electrical power by offering non-fuel-cycle nations commercially competitive and reliable access to nuclear fuel, in exchange for their commitment to forgo the development of enrichment and recycling technologies. “
The new world order comes in the form of new safeguards within the IAEA control system. Considering the spirit of the Additional Protocol we should not count on equal rights or fair relations.
Within the Non-Proliferation Treaty countries, only the nuclear-weapon states, plus Germany, the Netherlands and Japan have enrichment facilities today.  The rest of the NPT countries would see their rights to enrich uranium taken away. In exchange, they will get the solemn promises of the nuclear-weapon states, that the latter will always deliver the nuclear fuel. Promises? Weren’t these the countries that promised in 1968 to strive for their nuclear disarmament? As we know, they did not keep their word up to now. Worse, France has even developed a new generation of nuclear weapons to make the step to nuclear war easier and progressive. This year, France and the US are still using their nuclear arsenal to threaten the world. Non-nuclear-weapon states should now give away more rights and become dependent of IAEA’s club of nuclear fuel suppliers?
To seduce non-nuclear-weapon states, this new plan promises lower electricity prices. Today, on a global scale, enrichment facilities would have about twice the capacity the world needs. By preventing the construction of new enrichment facilities, a better use could be made of the existing capacities. This would enable lower prices for enriched uranium, and thus of electricity… Should we believe these words? The enrichment industries are not driven by the concern to lower world’s electricity prices. In spite of the world’s over-capacity the Europeans are considerably expanding their production in the UK, Netherlands and Germany. They strive for more market share and more profit! And if by new IAEA regulations no new competitors are allowed on the market, this can only result in excessive pricing of enriched uranium, and thus of electricity.
The new plans foresee a highly regulated and closely monitored fuel supply distribution system. The IAEA would become the intermediate between fuel producing and fuel consuming members. At first glance this may look like a trustworthy construction, since the IAEA is a UN body. However, the IAEA is also the policeman in the system. I do not think it is wise to let policemen trade with the parties they should inspect. Besides, the UN is not some sort of democratic and integer government that would be able to guarantee their policemen’s impartiality.
The plans for the distribution system recommend minimal national stocks and joint regional buffers in different host-countries. Strange, isn’t it? The purpose of minimal stocks inside the countries and regional stocks elsewhere is hardly to defend as a security issue. Even with enormous stocks of 3.5 percent enriched uranium you cannot produce any nuclear weapon. Why would the IAEA want countries to dispose of only small quantities of fuel at a time? I fear there is only one plausible answer: to keep the non-nuclear-weapon states in a firm grip. That is a lot of power for our NPT-watchdog. This power goes far beyond what is needed for their inspections. Even far beyond the needs of a safe nuclear fuel distribution system. This is pure power to overrule nations’ sovereignty. If a nation does anything that the watchdog or its masters do not want, the fuel tap can simply be closed to obtain its immediate submission. It smells like a dictatorship on world-level. Of course, the fuel supplying countries will never be affected. They produce their own fuel.
In theory the master of the IAEA is the United Nations Organization. But does it work that way in reality? The IAEA has a difficult role, because it cannot ignore tensions and conflicts of interest between NPT members. The IAEA’s independence from parties’ national interests is constantly under strain. Its limited budget forces the IAEA to make choices, which are influenced by occurring conflicts. During the embargo against Iraq, we witnessed an IAEA driven crazy by Bush, who demanded each time more and more thorough controls. The dog was sent out over and over to make sure Iraq could be safely invaded. Although the IAEA has the obligation to keep all sensitive information from their investigations undisclosed, the US military constantly received sensitive information, with which they prepared the invasion in 2003. (And finally, to invade Iraq, Bush simply overruled the UN’s Security Council…)
Today, we see the same US’ influences in the IAEA’s investigations in Iran. Bush shouts and the dog runs to search for the stick. The rules for the new world order are presented as “an idea of ElBaradei and a proposal of Bush.”. I presume that both plans, the IAEA’s Multi-National Approach (NMA) and Bush’ Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), will merge into a final version dictated by the US.
Of course, getting a firm grip on all non-nuclear-weapon states as soon as they get addicted to nuclear energy is a major strategic coup. But there are far more advantages for the nuclear fuel suppliers. United under the umbrella of the IAEA, the market will be completely regulated. As all of them cooperate in the same organizations and all of them will be interested in the highest possible earnings, together they will set world’s nuclear fuel price. Just like today’s world’s oil prices are decided on the market places of IPE and NYMEX, nuclear fuel prices will be decided by the happy few.
Now comes the tricky part. Nuclear fuel has to be paid for. The question is: in what currency (or currencies) will the customers have to pay? These currencies will become the most needed and wanted currencies in the world. You can compare it to today’s US-dollar.
Apparently these currencies have not been decided yet. But, if each fuel supplier asks to be paid in its own currency, the world would widely accept Japanese yens, Chinese Yuan renminbi, Russian Rubles, euros, English pounds and US-dollars. There will probably be some preferential order due to each supplier’s capacity to deliver nuclear fuel. Each of these countries will know the advantages of the supply of their currencies to the rest of the world. Of course, in the long run, each of them will also experience the negative effects on their economies and, after decades, let their currency collapse to get rid of the built up debt. In short, this is what can happen with multiple world currencies. However, the fact that the plans mention, that the IAEA should become the intermediary between suppliers and customers, makes it reasonable to suppose that the IAEA will decide in which currency the customers will have to pay. Bush surely hopes that this will be the dollar. When nuclear fuel has to be paid exclusively in dollars, demand for US-dollars and therewith the US hegemony will be assured for many decades to come.
The UN theatre
With the project for a new world order prepared discretely in the background, we now have an anti-Iranian alliance of the US and E3. They smell the opportunity for a coup to seize world’s nuclear fuel market. To succeed, they would just need some legal sauce on the prohibition of uranium enrichment by non-nuclear-weapon states, with Iran as example. And a UN Security Council resolution would be enough, if it legalizes IAEA’s stand that it can forbid countries to enrich uranium.
Of course, they would make it impossible for Iran to stay within the Non-Proliferation Treaty then. To succeed their coup, they will have to take care, that Iran does not leave the organization before a resolution is successfully voted. For if so, there would not be any ground for a resolution anymore. Countries outside the Non-Proliferation treaty, like Israel, India, Pakistan, Cuba and Brazil are free to enrich uranium and do what they want.
The question is: will the US and E3 succeed in seducing Russia and China?
In the event, that such a coup of the nuclear-weapon states would succeed, it would probably put the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the UNO under enormous strain. These organizations might loose all credibility and see many non-nuclear-weapon states leave. The result may be opposite to what these organizations were designed for.
 NPT members: http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Tracking_Ch02map.pdf
 NPT text: http://disarmament2.un.org/wmd/npt/npttext.html (See article IV)
 Agreement IAEA-Iran:
 Iran’s nuclear history: http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/1825_1826.html
 Growing opposition against the shah:
 60 percent dependency on oil imports: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000087&sid=ar4D7HVGikXo&refer=top_world_news
 130 gram of uranium: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/iaea0603.html (last line)
 article 37 of IAEA’s agreement with Iran: http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf
 How can the dollar collapse in Iran? http://www.studien-von-zeitfragen.net/Zeitfragen/__Collapse_in_Iran/__collapse_in_iran.html
 Fred Eckhard stating UN’s permission for Iraq’s switch to the euro: http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2000/20001031.db103100.doc.html
 Statistics of Iraqi oil exports in euros:
 Colin Nunan, Petrodollar or Petroeuro: http://www.feasta.org/documents/review2/nunan.htm
 IMF warning over dollar collapse: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2097064.stm
 dollar rates, historical data: http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/data.html
 Financial Times, June 5th 2003
 Oil markets, exemple: http://www.nationalreview.com/nrof_leuffer/leuffer200410010726.asp
Speculation and fear can, per definition, be influenced.
 Iranian Oil Bourse May 2006: http://www.iribnews.ir/Full_en.asp?news_id=212013&n=32
 GNEP: http://www.gnep.energy.gov/
 Uranium enrichment: http://www.uic.com.au/nip33.htm
 UN brochure 2004: http://www.un.org/secureworld/brochure.pdf
 NMA expert group February 2005: http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/ST/NE/NENP/NPTDS/Downloads/SMR_CRP1_SRWOSR/2005/RCM1/Add%20materials/mna-2005_web.pdf
 ElBaradei’s idea and Bush’ proposal. February 7, 2006: http://www.jaea.go.jp/04/np/documents/sym05_01_endo_en.pdf
 Map of world’s nuclear fuel stations: http://www.wise-uranium.org/umaps.html?set=enr
LIST OF ARTICLES:
Petrodollar Warfare: Dollars, Euros and the Upcoming Iranian Oil Bourse by William R. Clark (Friday August 05 2005) http://usa.mediamonitors.net/content/view/full/17450
Killing the dollar in Iran, By Toni Straka, "With the world facing a daily bill of roughly $5.5 billion for crude oil at current price levels," http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/GH26Dj01.html
America's Foreign Owners, Thursday, September 22, 2005 http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=article&id=1712
The Proposed Iranian Oil Bourse, Krassimir Petrov, Ph. D., January 17, 2006 http://www.321gold.com/editorials/petrov/petrov011706.html
Trading oil in euros - does it matter?, by Cóilín Nunan, Published on 30 Jan 2006 by Energy Bulletin. http://www.energybulletin.net/12463.html
of article: US-IRAN: Raid on nuclear
fuel market email@example.com
|Pentagon Generals for Rumsfeld Resignation Common Dreams|
|Middle East Nuclear Weapons Free Zone|
|Shanghai Cooperation Organization|
|From 9/11 ... to Baghdad ... to Tehran? Neo-con plan?|
|Flash Review, Pentagon attack, 9/11 A Missile? or a Boeing 757 or both?||From 9/11 ... to Baghdad ... to Tehran? Neo-con plan?|
|A New Bretton Woods?|
|The Coming Financial Crises? by Dr. Abbas Bakhtiar
On May 17, the Dow Jones plunged 214 points to 11,206—its worst point drop since March 2003. The downward trend is a warning sign of troubles ahead.
This sudden drop came as a complete surprise to the unfortunate small investors and speculators. The so-called "experts" point at the sudden threat of inflation as the main cause of the recent reversals in the markets. What is actually surprising is the surprise of the "experts." A cursory look at the United States' finances will reveal the amount of pressure that its economy is under.
When Bush became President in 2001, the United States' public debt was $5.8 trillion. Today the public debt stands at $8.3 trillion. Of this, over $2.2 trillion is held by foreigners. The United States has a GDP of $12.4 trillion. This gives the U.S. a debt/GDP ratio of 66%, placing it in 35th place (out of 113) on the ranking of the debtor nations. The current account deficit of over 7 percent has long passed its danger levels of 4-5 percent. In 2005, the U.S. government paid $325 billion in interest payments alone.
Then there are the future obligations such as Medicare, Social Security, and government pensions. These obligations amount to $54 trillion. This huge problem worried former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan. In Autumn 2004, he told Congress: "As a nation, we may have already made promises to coming generations of retirees that we will be unable to fulfill."
One would think that this amount of debt would worry the President and the Congress. But apparently it does not. The U.S. Congress voted to increase the Federal debt limit to $9 trillion in March 2006. Any other nation in similar circumstances would have had to approach the IMF for help. The IMF would then have forced that nation to cut spending and devalue its currency. But the United States does not need to do this. The U.S. can just print more dollars. But how long can this continue before the world loses faith in the greenback, sending it crashing to unimaginable levels?
The Asian Lender Asian countries such as Japan, China, and others that hold most of the U.S. debts have been happy to indulge the American deficit spending. This has been a two-way street, as America has kept its market open to their products and they have financed the Americans' spending.
The value of the U.S. dollar so far has been kept artificially high by Japan, China, and oil-exporting countries. These countries, by buying U.S. debts, have kept interest rates relatively low in the United States and allowed Americans to keep spending even as their debts mount.
But there is only so much risk these lenders are willing to take. Any serious devaluation of the dollar will considerably reduce the value of their national reserves (mostly kept in dollars) and the value of their debt holdings (certificates, bonds, etc.). At the same time, the devaluation will affect their exports to the U.S. A weaker dollar makes their products more expensive in the U.S., thereby reducing their export earnings. Most Asian countries keep up to 70 percent of their reserves in dollars. China, with reserves of over $800 billion, has already begun to slowly reduce its dependency on dollars by converting part of its reserves to other currencies.
If other Asian countries—with their vast dollar holdings—follow suit, then it will be disastrous for the value of the dollar. No one is interested in holding a weakening currency.
Another threat against the dollar comes from countries such as Iran and Venezuela. Iran recently put in motion plans to register an oil bourse to compete with bourses in New York and London. The threat comes from the currency in which the oil is to be sold, the euro. Iranians are going to make the euro the standard currency for oil transactions. Some sympathetic countries such as Venezuela and others may join in. If the Iranians succeed in this, the pressure on the dollar will be catastrophic. Nearly every country has to hold a certain amount of dollars in reserve for oil purchases. If the dollar continues to weaken in value, and there is the possibility of purchasing oil in euros, then these countries would unload their dollars for safer currencies such as the euro. What will then happen to the value of the dollar?
As though there is not enough pressure on the dollar, the U.S. government keeps spending money in an unwinnable war in Iraq. The total cost of the Iraq war, including the future payments to disabled soldiers, the replacement of equipment, etc., is estimated to be between $1 and 2 trillion.
The tense situation in the region will keep oil prices at uncomfortable levels, contributing to both a reduction in U.S. growth and an increase in its deficit.
The current American deficit and its long-term financial obligations, if left unanswered, will sooner or later lead to either a marked increase in interest rates or a substantial devaluation of the dollar. On one hand, a substantial increase in interest rates will lead to a major recession in the U.S.A. which will be felt immediately around the world. On the other hand, a substantial devaluation will cause global financial chaos. What is needed is a serious reconsideration of the international role of the dollar as the world currency. In other words, we need a new Bretton Woods Agreement.
At the end of World War II, 45 nations gathered at a United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire to address the problems of reconstruction, monetary stability, and exchange rates. The delegates agreed to establish an international monetary system of convertible currencies, fixed exchange rates, and free trade. To facilitate these objectives, the delegates agreed to create two international institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the World Bank). An initial loan of $250 million to France in 1947 was the World Bank's first act.
Since then there has already been considerable criticism of the roles of the IMF and the World Bank. The abovementioned problems and the ongoing trade imbalance in the world have to be addressed by a similar gathering. Sooner or later, both the United States and the rest of the world have to address the existing problems. This problem is not the United States' alone. We can not ignore the largest economy on earth. It is said that if the United States sneezes, the world catches a cold. We have to either make sure that the United States doesn't catch a cold or vaccinate ourselves against it.
|July 27, 2010 -- Release of Megrahi for BP oil
concession in Libya was wrong reason for release: Megrahi had nothing to
do with PanAm 103 bombing source: source:
Washington is yet to experience another "theater of the absurd" as the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, chaired by Senator John Kerry (D-MA) prepares to hold hearings on Scotland's decision to release Abdel Baset al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison where he was serving a life sentence after being the sole person convicted of planting a bomb on board PanAm 103 in 1988, resulting in the crash of the plane over Lockerbie, Scotland.
Kerry's committee, under pressure from Israel's leading allies in the Senate, is trying to pressure Britain and Scotland to come clean on 2007 negotiations between Tony Blair's government and BP over which Megrahi's release from Scotland to Libya was discussed as a way to improve the oil giant's chances of landing lucrative oil deals with Colonel Qaddafi's government.
President Obama feigned anger on more than one occasion over Megrahi's release last August but a recent letter that surfaced from the U.S. embassy in London indicates that the Obama administration was quietly backing Megrahi's release with BP being the ultimate winner. The letter is further proof of BP's influence over the Obama administration, which was painfully obvious to the residents of the U.S. Gulf coast when Obama allowed BP to run the show in the wake of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig catastrophe.
Scottish First Minister Alex Salmond has charged that Blair was and continues to be involved in secret negotiations with Libya and BP on the consummation of oil deals. Salmond has told the Senate committee to call Blair to testify about the former prime minister's secret dealings with Colonel Qaddafi's government. The Scottish govenrment denies having any contact with BP over Megrahi's release.
However, it appears that Obama had more than a passing interest in Megrahi's prison sentence in Scotland. On August 12, 2009, the deputy chief of mission at the U.S. embassy in London, Richard LeBaron, sent a letter to Salmond stating that while the U.S. was opposed to Megrahi's transfer to Libya, the United States would not be opposed to his conditional release on compassionate grounds to live in Scotland. LeBaron is a career Foreign Service officer who has mainly served in the Middle East, including a 2001 to 2004 stint as Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. embassy in Tel Aviv. In 1988, when PanAm 103 was bombed over Scotland, LeBaron served at the U.S. embassy in Tunis, a stone's throw from Malta, where Megrahi and his Libyan intelligence colleague were said to have arranged for a suitcase bomb destined for PanAm 103 to be placed on a feeder flight to Frankfurt and on to Heathrow in London for transfer to the ill-fated Boeing 747 heading for New York. LeBaron would have been privy to classified U.S. embassy cables from Valletta concerning the investigation of Libya's intelligence operations in Malta, including the alleged Libyan involvement in the PanAm bombing.
Megrahi was reported to have been suffering from terminal cancer when he was released but his condition has reportedly improved since he has been in Libya. The Obama administration contends that it favored a release of Megrahi in Scotland so that he would not receive a "hero's welcome" in his native Libya, which, of course, he did upon his return last August. But, as the late columnist Jack Anderson reported, Britain's Tory government and Obama have reasons to insist on pushing the discredited story that Qaddafi was involved in PanAm 103's bombing.
On January 11, 1990, Anderson reported from Washington that "President Bush and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher secretly agreed last spring to play down the truth about who blew up PanAm Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. After both leaders had intelligence reports pointing the finger at a terrorist hired by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Thatcher called Bush. In that conversation, they agreed that neither could stand the political heat of making the evidence public because both were impotent to retaliate."
Anderson's column continued, "Highly placed White House sources told us that the phone call took place about mid-March. By that time, both the British and U.S. intelligence services had followed the trail of evidence to terrorist Ahmed Jibril as the hit man who was paid by Iran to blow up the plane. The intelligence services had evidence that Khomeini and his successor, Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, had approved the bombing."
It should be noted that Rafsanjani became a key backer of Mir-Hosein Mousavi, the failed presidential candidate who failed to unseat Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad last year. Ironically, Rafsanjani, a backer of the failed "Green Revolution," is now seen as a moderate by Washington and London. It is yet another reason to keep the Lockerbie heat on Libya.
Anderson's report stated, "The intelligence reports told Bush and Thatcher that Jibril went to Iran in July 1988 and struck the deal with Khomeini and Rafsanjani to blow up an American plane in retaliation for the accidental U.S. downing of an Iranian airliner earlier that month. When the intelligence reports began to leak last March, Thatcher called Bush to discuss their problem. She said no purpose would be served by making public the evidence against Iran because neither the United States or Britain could respond." Thatcher's knowledge that it was Iran that brought down PanAm 103 would cause trouble for her Tory heir, Prime Minister David Cameron, who, in 1989, was a young Conservative Party operative serving Thatcher. For Obama, the knowledge that the CIA was cognizant of Iran's role in PanAm 103 could spell trouble as more details emerge about Obama's own past with the CIA.
According to Anderson, "Bush knew that Khomeini had proved the undoing of Jimmy Carter and had nearly proved the undoing of Ronald Reagan. Carter lost an election because he couldn't get American hostages back from Iran, and Reagan suffered the biggest blow of his presidency when he tried to trade arms to Iran for American hostages." However, it was Bush, himself, who helped arrange to keep American hostages in Iran until after the November 1980 election, in return for secret weapons, and who also helped arrange the weapons-for-hostages in Lebanon deals that ultimately ended up as the "Iran-contra" scandal. In 1990, Bush, who was known to have designs on Saddam Hussein's Iraq, had to ensure there were no fingers pointing at Iran, who Bush had to keep neutral in a U.S.-Iraqi military confrontation over Kuwait. Bush could not afford to alienate Syria, Jibril's main backer, since Bush needed Syria in the coalition that would later attack Iraq.
WMR previously published a formerly SECRET Air Intelligence Agency message describing Iran's role in the attack on PanAm 103.
Anderson continued, "So Bush didn't argue when Thatcher suggested that they 'low-key' the findings -- say that the investigation was inconclusive and long-term. After the call, word was quickly passed to top officials conducting the PanAm investigation that they were not to make any off-the-record remarks implicating Jibril or Iran. In Britain, when the press speculated about possible perpetrators, investigators called the speculation 'wild' and 'irresponsible.'
U.S. intelligence sources who told us about the call said the decision was political cowardice. Thatcher, the 'Iron Lady,' earned her reputation in a war with Argentina over the Falkland Islands. But by last March, her popularity was on the wane and she didn't need to be embarrassed by Khomeini. Bush, still fighting his 'wimp' image, didn't want to face the ultimate calls for retribution."
And Cameron, inheriting the Tory leadership, doesn't want Thatcher to be shown as a liar and Obama, who has bent over backwards trying to placate the intelligence community, doesn't want to have to admit that the American people were subjected to yet another fraud courtesy of the boys at Langley.
|Pan Am Flight 103 conspiracy theories, Wikipedia|
|Pan Am Flight 103 conspiracy theories suggest a number of possible
explanations for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 on 21 December 1988.
Some of the theories preceded the official investigation by Scottish
police and the FBI; others arose through a different interpretation of
evidence presented at Libyan agent Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed Al Megrahi's
2000/2001 trial; yet others have been developed independently by
individuals and organisations outside the official investigation. The
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC)
was the first suspect, in light of a threat it issued against U.S. and
Israeli interests before the bombing. The state of Iran was also in the
frame very early, with its motive thought to be revenge for the July
1988 shooting down of Iran Air Flight 655 by USS Vincennes. This
theory was later reinforced by Abolghasem Mesbahi, former head of
Iranian intelligence operations in Europe, who stated after defecting to
Germany that Iran had asked Libya and Abu Nidal, a Palestinian guerrilla
leader, to carry out the attack on Pan Am 103. In his 1994 film The
Maltese Double Cross, Allan Francovich suggested that rogue CIA agents
were implicated in a plot that involved them turning a blind eye to a
drug running operation in return for intelligence. Evidence presented at
Megrahi's trial, together with concerns about the reliability of his
conviction, spawned a theory that Libya was framed. Abu Nidal allegedly
confessed to the bombing before his death, thereby triggering another
theory, while Joe Vialls put forward his own explanation that relied on
the bomb being detonated remotely. Finally, in December 1989, Patrick
Haseldine suggested that the bombing was an assassination by South
Africa's apartheid government of United Nations Commissioner for
Namibia, Bernt Carlsson. Contents [hide] 1 PFLP-GC 2 Iran 3 CIA drug
smuggling 4 Alleged framing of Libya 4.1 Recent Libyan history 4.2 Lord
Advocate's comment 4.3 Reliance on forensic science 5 Iran and the
London angle 6 Libya and Abu Nidal 7 Radio detonation 8 South-West
Africa (Namibia) 9 Review by American RadioWorks 10 References 11
External links 12 See also PFLP-GC
For many months after the bombing, the prime suspects were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC), a Damascus-based rejectionist group led by former Syrian army captain Ahmed Jibril, sponsored by Iran. In a February 1986 press conference, Jibril warned: "There will be no safety for any traveler on an Israeli or U.S. airliner" (Cox and Foster 1991, p28). Secret intercepts were reported by author, David Yallop, to have recorded the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Pasdaran) in Baalbeck, Lebanon making contact with the PFLP-GC immediately after the downing of the Iran Air Airbus. Israeli intelligence allegedly intercepted a telephone call made two days after PA 103 by Mohtashemi-Pur, Interior Minister in Tehran, to the chargé d'affaires at the Iranian embassy in Beirut, instructing the embassy to hand over the funds to Jibril and congratulating them on the success of operation 'Intekam' ('equal and just revenge'). Jibril is alleged to have received $11 million from Iran - although a banking audit trail to confirm the payment has never been presented. Jibril's right hand man, Hafez Dalkamoni, set up a PFLP-GC cell which was active in the Frankfurt and Neuss areas of West Germany in October 1988, two months before PA 103. During what Germany's internal security service, the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), called Operation Herbstlaub (Operation "Autumn Leaves"), the BfV kept cell members under strict surveillance. The plotters prepared a number of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) hidden inside household electronic equipment. They discussed a planned operation in coded calls to Cyprus and Damascus: oranges and apples stood for detonating devices; medicine and pasta for Semtex explosive; and, auntie for the bomb carrier. One operative had been recorded as saying: "auntie should get off, but should leave the suitcase on the bus" (Duffy and Emerson 1990). The PFLP-GC cell had an experienced bomb-maker, Jordanian Marwan Khreesat, to assist them. Khreesat made at least one IED inside a single-speaker Toshiba Bombeat 453 radio cassette recorder, similar to the twin speaker model RT-SF 16 Bombeat that was used to blow up PA 103. However, unlike the Lockerbie bomb with its sophisticated timer, Khreesat's IEDs contained a barometric pressure device that triggers a simple timer with a range of up to 45 minutes before detonation. Unbeknown to the PFLP-GC cell, its bomb-maker Khreesat was a Jordanian intelligence service (GID) agent and reported on the cell's activities to the GID, who relayed the information to Western intelligence and to the BfV. The Jordanians encouraged Khreesat to make the bombs but instructed him to ensure they were ineffective and would not explode. (A German police technician would however be killed, in April 1989, when trying to disarm one of Khreesat's IEDs). Through Khreesat and the GID, the Germans learned that the cell was surveying a number of targets, including Iberia Flight 888 from Madrid to Tel Aviv via Barcelona, chosen because the bomb-courier could disembark without baggage at Barcelona leaving the barometric trigger to activate the IED on the next leg of the journey. The date chosen, Khreesat reportedly told his handlers, was 30 October 1988. He also told them that two members of the cell had been to Frankfurt airport to pick up Pan Am timetables. Acting upon this intelligence, the German secret police moved in to arrest the PFLP-GC cell on 26 October, raiding 14 apartments and arresting 17 men, fearing that to keep them under surveillance much longer was to risk losing control of the situation. Two cell members are known to have escaped arrest including Abu Elias, a resident of Sweden who, according to Prime Time Live (ABC News November 1989), was an expert in bombs sent to Germany to check on Khreesat's devices because of suspicions raised by Ahmed Jibril. Four IEDs were recovered, but Khreesat stated later that a fifth device had been taken away by Dalkamoni before the raid, and was never recovered. The link to PA 103 was further strengthened when Khreesat told investigators that, before joining the cell in Germany, he had bought five Toshiba Bombeat cassette radios from a smugglers' village in Syria close to the border with Lebanon, and made practice IEDs out of them in Jibril's training camp 20 km (12 miles) away. The bombs were inspected by Abu Elias, who declared them to be good work. What became of these devices is not known. Some journalists such as Private Eye's Paul Foot and a PA 103 relative, Dr Jim Swire, believed that it was too stark a coincidence for a Toshiba cassette radio IED to have downed PA 103 just eight weeks after the arrest of the PFLP-GC cell in Frankfurt. Indeed, Scottish police actually wrote up an arrest warrant for Marwan Khreesat in the spring of 1989, but were persuaded by the FBI not to issue it because of his value as an intelligence source. In the following spring, King Hussein of Jordan arranged for Khreesat to be interviewed by FBI agent, Edward Marshman, and the former head of the FBI's forensic lab, Thomas Thurman, to whom he described in detail the bombs he had built. In the 1994 documentary film Maltese Double Cross, the author David Yallop speculated that Libyan and Iranian-paid agents may have worked on the bombing together; or, that one group handed the job over to a second group upon the arrest of the PFLP-GC cell members. The former CIA head of counter-terrorism, Vincent Cannistraro, who previously worked on the PA 103 investigation, was interviewed in the film and said he believed the PFLP-GC planned the attack at the behest of the Iranian government, then sub-contracted it to Libyan intelligence after October 1988, because the arrests in Germany meant the PFLP-GC was unable to complete the operation. Other supporters of this theory believed that whoever paid for the bombing arranged two parallel operations intended to ensure that at least one would succeed; or, that Jibril's cell in Germany was a red herring designed to attract the attention of the intelligence services, while the real bombers worked quietly elsewhere. Iran
A number of journalists considered that the Iranian revenge motive (retaliation for the shooting down of the Iran Air Airbus by USS Vincennes) was prematurely dismissed by investigators. They drew attention to a comment by former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher in her 1993 memoirs, where she seemed to discount the Libya revenge motive (for the 1986 bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi by the United States air force): "It turned out to be a more decisive blow against Libyan-sponsored terrorism than I could ever have imagined. ...There were revenge killings of British hostages organized by Libya, which I bitterly regretted. But the much-vaunted Libyan counter attack did not and could not take place... There was a marked decline in Libyan-sponsored terrorism in succeeding years" (Thatcher 1993, pp448-9). Additionally, Abolghasem Mesbahi, former head of Iranian intelligence in Europe, eventually defected and "told [German] investigators that Iran had asked Libya and Abu Nidal, a Palestinian guerrilla leader, to carry out the attack on Pan Am 103."  The US Defense Intelligence Agency alleges that Ali Akbar Mohtashamipur (Ayatollah Mohtashemi), a member of the Iranian government, paid US$ 10 million for the bombing: Ayatollah Mohtashemi: (...) and was the one who paid the same amount to bomb Pan Am Flight 103 in retaliation for the US shoot-down of the Iranian Airbus. Part of report, which is dated 1989-09-24, cites information acquired at Ft. Meade, MD: The mission was to blow up a Pan Am flight that was to be almost entirely booked by US military personnel on Christmas leave. The flight was supposed to be a direct flight from Frankfurt, GE, to New York, not Pan Am flight 103 which was routed through London, UK. The suitcase containing the bomb was labeled with the name of one of the US passengers on the plane and was inadvertently placed on the wrong plane possibly by airport ground crew members in Frankfurt. The terrorist who last handled the bomb was not a passenger on the flight. and The bomb was designed by Mu'Ay Al-Din ((Mughanniya)), a Lebanese national who lives in IR and who is supposedly Iran's expert on aircraft bombing and high-jacking operations. The bomb was constructed in LY and then shipped to GE for placement on the aircraft (NFI). CIA drug smuggling
This theory suggests that U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) agents had set up a protected drug route from Europe to the United States—allegedly called Operation Corea—that allowed Syrian drug dealers, led by Monzer al-Kassar (who was involved with Oliver North in the Iran-Contra scandal) to ship heroin to the U.S. using Pan Am flights, in exchange for intelligence on Palestinian groups holding hostages in Syria. The CIA allegedly protected the suitcases containing the drugs and made sure they were not searched. On the day of the bombing, as the theory goes, terrorists exchanged suitcases: one with drugs for one with a bomb. Time introduced another version of this theory, claiming that the American intelligence officers on PA 103 – Matthew Gannon and Maj. Charles McKee – had found out about the drug operation, and were headed to Washington to raise their concerns about its impact on their hostage rescue plans. Juval Aviv introduced a variation of this story in October 1989. Aviv was the owner of Interfor Inc, a private investigation company based on Madison Avenue, New York. Aviv claimed to be a former Mossad officer who led the Operation Wrath of God team that assassinated members of Black September who were believed to have been responsible for the Munich Massacre in 1972. According to his theory, the CIA knew in advance that the baggage exchange would take place, but let it happen anyway, because the protected drugs route was a rogue operation, and the American intelligence officers on PA 103 – Matthew Gannon and Maj. Charles McKee – had found out about it, and were on their way to Washington to tell their superiors. After PA 103, Aviv was employed by Pan Am as their lead investigator for the bombing. He submitted a report (the Interfor report) in October 1989, blaming the bombing on a CIA-protected drugs route (Barrons December 17, 1989). This scenario provided Pan Am with a credible defense against claims for compensation by relatives of victims, since, if the U.S. government had helped the bomb bypass Pan Am's security, the airline could hardly have been held liable. The Interfor report alleged inter alia that Khalid Jafaar, a Lebanese-American passenger with links to Hezbollah, had unwittingly brought the bomb on board thinking he was carrying drugs on behalf of Syrian drug dealers he supposedly worked for. However, the New York court, which heard the civil case lodged by the U.S. relatives, rejected the Interfor allegations for lack of evidence. Aviv was never interviewed by either the Scottish police or the FBI in connection with PA 103. In 1990 the protected suitcase theory was given a new lease of life by Lester Coleman in his book Trail of the Octopus. Coleman was a former journalist-turned-intelligence agent working with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) while employed by Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in Cyprus. Coleman claimed to have seen Khalid Jafaar in the DEA office in Nicosia, Cyprus once again implying that Jafaar was a drugs mule, but this time for the DEA instead of Syrian drug dealers. In 1997, Coleman pleaded guilty to five counts of perjury in a Federal court after admitting that he submitted a false testimony in a civil litigation brought on behalf of the families of passengers killed in the bombing. Coleman's theory gained impetus when British journalist Paul Foot wrote a glowing review of Coleman's book for the London Review of Books. But on March 31, 2004—four months before his death—Foot reverted to the orthodox Iran/PFLP-GC theory in an article he wrote for The Guardian entitled "Lockerbie's dirty secret". The previously-mentioned 1994 documentary film The Maltese Double Cross – Lockerbie, which included interviews with Lester Coleman and Juval Aviv, seemed to favour a hybrid version embracing both the CIA-protected suitcase and the drugs mule versions of the theory. Shortly after the film was broadcast by Channel 4 television on 11 May 1995, Aviv was indicted on fraud charges. Aviv was quick to claim that these were trumped-up charges, and in due course they were dropped. The film can be viewed on the internet here  by scrolling down to Allan Francovich - The Maltese Double Cross. Alleged framing of Libya
This conspiracy theory is based on the premise that key evidence presented at the trial (e.g. timer fragment, parts from a specific radio cassette model, clothing bought in Malta, bomb suitcase originating at Luqa Airport) could have been fabricated by the U.S. and Britain for the "political" purpose of incriminating Libya. Recent Libyan history Muammar al-Gaddafi's regime in Libya has a long and well-documented history of support for rebel and paramilitary groups. During the 1970s and 1980s, Gaddafi supplied large quantities of Libyan weapons and explosives to the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Other incidents that have been attributed to Libya are not so clear cut: The 1984 murder of police constable Yvonne Fletcher outside the Libyan embassy in London was blamed on Libya and led to a long-term rupture of diplomatic relations. No prosecution has taken place, but Libya has paid compensation to WPC Fletcher's family and recently allowed Scotland Yard to interview suspects in that country. US president Ronald Reagan was convinced that Libya was responsible for the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing – in which two American servicemen were killed and another 50 injured – and, in retaliation, ordered the bombing of Tripoli in Operation El Dorado Canyon. In 2001, a Libyan and two Palestinians were convicted and imprisoned by Berlin's Supreme Court, and in 2004 Gaddafi agreed to pay $35 million in compensation to the non-American victims of the Berlin bombing. A French court convicted six Libyans nationals (some members of Libyan Intelligence) in absentia of the 1989 bombing of French UTA Flight 772. The bomb bore remarkable similarities to the one that brought down Pan Am 103, since it was also consisted of PETN (Semtex) carried in a Samsonite suitcase and detonated by a timing device. France at the time supported Libya's neighbour Chad in a border dispute. A Paris court convicted six Libyan. With remarkable parallels to the Lockerbie trial, the Paris court heard that UTA Flight 772 was brought down by a bomb triggered by a sophisticated timing device. Libya supplied the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) with tonnes of Semtex — amongst other weapons. See also Provisional IRA arms importation#Libyan arms. At the end of the Pan Am Flight 103 bombing trial an international observer appointed by the United Nations, Hans Köchler, called the verdict a "spectacular miscarriage of justice". Even though Libya never formally admitted responsibility for Pan Am Flight 103 or UTA Flight 772, Libya "accepted responsibility for the actions of its officials" and agreed to pay compensation to the relatives of the victims. In October 2008 Libya paid $1.5 billion into a fund which will be used to compensate relatives of the Lockerbie bombing victims with the remaining 20% of the sum agreed in 2003 ($2.7 billion); American victims of the 1986 Berlin discotheque bombing; American victims of the 1989 UTA Flight 772 bombing; and, Libyan victims of the 1986 US bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. Lord Advocate's comment In an address to a conference of law officers in August 2001 (seven months after the PA 103 verdict) the Scottish Lord Advocate, Lord Boyd, rejected any suggestion that Libya had been framed and denied that this was a politically-driven prosecution, instead blaming conspiracy theorists for such allegations: "Conspiracy theorists have alleged that the investigators' move away from an interest in the PFLP-GC was prompted by political interference following a re-alignment of interests in the Middle East. Specifically it is said that it suited Britain and the United States to exonerate Syria and others such as Iran who might be associated with her and to blame Libya, a country which we know trained the IRA. Accordingly, evidence was 'found' which implicated Libya. This is best answered by looking at the evidence." The Lord Advocate went on to list the various pieces of evidence found to prove that the PA 103 investigators' interest in Libya was "as a result of the evidence which was discovered and not as a result of any political interference in the investigation". He reiterated: "There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that there was political interference. The investigation was evidence-led." Lord Boyd dealt with each piece of evidence, as follows: Toshiba radio cassette fragment: "evidence was obtained from Toshiba [by DERA's Alan Feraday] which showed that during October 1988 20,000 black Toshiba RT-SF 16 radio cassettes, the type used in the Pan Am bomb, were shipped to Libya. Of the total world-wide sales of that model 76% were sold to the General Electric Company's subsidiary in Libya, whose chairman was Said Rashid.[information added]" Mebo timer fragment: "In June 1990, with the assistance ultimately of the CIA and FBI, Alan Feraday of the Explosives Laboratory was able to identify the fragment as identical to circuitry from an MST-13 timer. It was already known to the CIA from an example seized in Togo in 1986 and photographed by them in Senegal in 1988. That took investigators to the firm of Mebo in Zurich. It was discovered that these timers had been manufactured to the order of two Libyans Ezzadin Hinshin, at the time director of the Central Security Organisation of the Libyan External Security Organisation and Said Rashid, then head of the Operations Administration of the ESO." Clothing material: "In September 1989 Tony Gauci, the shopkeeper, was interviewed by Scottish police officers. He convincingly identified a range of clothing which he had sold to a man sometime before Christmas 1988. Among the items he remembered selling were two pairs of Yorkie trousers, two pairs of striped pyjamas, a tweed jacket, a blue babygro, two slalom shirts collar size 16 and a half, two cardigans, one brown and one blue and an umbrella. He described the man, and subsequently identified him as Megrahi. More importantly at the time he was in no doubt that he was a Libyan." Reliance on forensic science Warning against over-reliance upon forensic science to secure convictions, one of Britain's foremost criminal lawyers, Michael Mansfield QC, in the BBC Scotland Frontline Scotland TV programme Silence over Lockerbie, broadcast on 14 October 1997, said he wanted to make just one point: "Forensic science is not immutable. They're not written in tablets of stone, and the biggest mistake that anyone can make—public, expert or anyone else alike—is to believe that forensic science is somehow beyond reproach: it is not! The biggest miscarriages of justice in the United Kingdom, many of them emanate from cases in which forensic science has been shown to be wrong. And the moment a forensic scientist or anyone else says: 'I am sure this marries up with that' I get worried." A number of news media also investigated the bombing and the various theories that were put forward to explain it. One news team headed by Pierre Salinger accused the prosecution of disinformation, and of attempting to steer the investigation toward Libya. Iran and the London angle
Towards the end of the bombing trial, lawyers for Megrahi argued that the PA 103 bomb could have started its journey at Heathrow, rather than at Luqa Airport in Malta. The Boeing 747 that was destined to carry the 259 passengers and crew on the London-New York leg had arrived from San Francisco at noon on 21 December 1988, and stood unguarded on the tarmac for much of the period before PA 103's passengers began to board the aircraft after 17:00 (scheduled departure 18:00). The Iran Air terminal in Heathrow was adjacent to the Pan Am terminal, and the two airlines shared tarmac space. The lawyers invoked the 1990 Scottish Fatal Accident Inquiry and the evidence it heard that the baggage container AVE 4041, into which the bomb suitcase had been loaded, was left unsupervised at Heathrow for about forty minutes that afternoon. Libya and Abu Nidal
Abu Nidal in the early 1980s Abu Nidal was widely regarded as the most ruthless international terrorist until that mantle was assumed by Osama bin Laden. Nidal (aka Sabri al-Banna) was reported to have died in a shoot-out in Baghdad on 16 August 2002. A former senior member of his group, Atef Abu Bakr, told journalists that shortly before his death Abu Nidal had confided to Bakr that he had orchestrated the PA 103 bombing. After settling in Tripoli in 1985, Nidal and the Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi allegedly became close, Gaddafi sharing what The Sunday Times called "Abu Nidal's dangerous combination of an inferiority complex mixed with the belief that he was a man of destiny." According to Atef Abu Bakr, Gaddafi asked Nidal to coordinate with the head of Libyan intelligence, Abdullah al-Senussi, an attack on the U.S. in retaliation for the 1986 bombing of Benghazi and Tripoli. Nidal then organized the hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 in Karachi on September 5, 1986 killing 22 passengers and wounding dozens of others. In August 1987, Abu Nidal allegedly tried again, this time using an unwitting bomb mule to carry a device on board a flight from Belgrade (airline unknown), but the bomb failed to explode. For PA 103, Senussi allegedly told Nidal to supply the bomb, and Libyan intelligence would arrange for it to be put on a flight. No evidence has been produced in support of these theories. Radio detonation
According to conspiracy theorist and self-styled private investigator Joe Vialls, who died in July 2005, the bomb on PA 103 was triggered not by a simple timing device, but by a more complex technique of radio detonation.
Explosion occurs shortly after Clipper Maid of the Seas passes Dean Cross navigational radio beacon The Vialls theory relies on the assumption that the aircraft was handed over to a different air traffic control center when it passed over the Dean Cross navigational beacon, requiring it to communicate on one of the 22 frequencies used by Shanwick Oceanic Control. Maid of the Seas would then have been flying at about 500 mph between Dean Cross beacon and where it crashed on the town of Lockerbie, an overall distance of 30 miles (48 km) representing a point-to-point flight time of barely four minutes. As PA 103 passed overhead the Dean Cross beacon, a light would have flashed on in the cockpit alerting the pilots to change frequency in order to obtain permission for the Atlantic crossing from Shanwick Oceanic Control at Prestwick, Scotland.[dubious – discuss] Using standard reaction times, according to Vialls, it would have taken between three and five minutes for the crew to be ready to communicate on the new frequency. In its PA 103 report, the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) stated: "At 18.58 hrs the aircraft established two-way radio contact with Shanwick Oceanic Control on frequency 123.95 MHz. At 19.02:44 hrs the clearance delivery officer at Shanwick transmitted to the aircraft its oceanic route clearance. The aircraft did not acknowledge this message and made no subsequent transmission." The AAIB report continued: "The cockpit voice recorder tape was listened to for its full duration and there was no indication of anything abnormal with the aircraft, or unusual crew behaviour. The tape record ended, at 19.02:50 hrs ± 1 second, with a sudden loud sound on the cockpit area microphone channel followed almost immediately by the cessation of recording whilst the crew were copying their transatlantic clearance from Shanwick ATC." The Vialls radio detonation theory puts forward two different triggering mechanisms: A remotely controlled bomb in the aircraft that was triggered by a radio signal sent from outside the aircraft A sophisticated device onboard the aircraft that monitored multiple variables including time and the use of specific air-traffic control frequencies by the aircraft. Vialls cited the following example of how the Israelis used the technique of radio detonation: In the late 1980s, Israeli intelligence managed to obtain the cellular phone of Yahya Ayyash by fooling him into believing that his phone had a fault; the phone was booby-trapped with explosives when he brought it in for repairs, then subsequently detonated by a signal sent over the Israeli-controlled mobile phone network when he answered it. According to Vialls, the inside of a Boeing 747 is a Faraday cage, which would ensure that secondary emissions—from the captain's radio message to Shanwick Oceanic Control, for example—would be sufficient to activate the radio trigger of the bomb. Thus, the PA 103 bomb could have been triggered by an internally-generated command radio signal transmitted to or received from Shanwick. However, Vialls believed that the extent of the damage caused to the aircraft meant that the bomb was probably positioned close to the fuselage, rather than—as the prosecution maintained at the trial—being wrapped in clothing, packed in a suitcase and loaded inside a baggage container. Vialls himself blamed the Israeli Mossad for the PA 103 bombing. This fitted with the general theme of Vialls's investigations: he blamed Israel and Mossad for a variety of international disasters and events, including the 2004 Asian Tsunami and the death of Diana, Princess of Wales. South-West Africa (Namibia)
Reuters: S. Africa Minister Denies Knowing of Lockerbie Bomb According to another theory, suggested by UK's Patrick Haseldine, apartheid South Africa was responsible for the sabotage of Pan Am Flight 103. The theory is rooted in an allegation made in the film the The Maltese Double Cross and by Die Zeit that the United States government knew of the bomb and warned staff from its embassies in Helsinki and Moscow, as well as a high-level South African delegation, to avoid the flight. Someone allegedly contacted the US embassy in Helsinki, Finland 16 days before the bombing, warning of a bomb on a Pan Am aircraft departing Frankfurt for the US; none of the staff at the Moscow embassy took the flight, despite it being a popular route for them over Christmas. The allegation prompted a strong statement in November 1994 from the private secretary of Pik Botha, then South African Foreign Minister, stating that "Had he known of the bomb, no force on earth would have stopped him from seeing to it that flight 103, with its deadly cargo, would not have left the airport." Review by American RadioWorks
In a special pre-trial report by American RadioWorks, the strengths and weaknesses of the case against Libya were explored. The report also examined in detail the evidence for and against the other main suspects in the first five alternative theories of this article. No evidence was offered in the report against either the radio detonation or the South-West Africa (Namibia) theory. References
^ a b c d Patrick Barkham (1999-04-07). "Lockerbie conspiracies: from A to Z". London: The Guardian. Retrieved 2009-05-25. ^ a b c "PAN AM Flight 103" (PDF). Defense Intelligence Agency, DOI 910200, page 49/50 (Pages 7 and 8 in PDF document, see also p. 111ff). Retrieved 2010-01-12. ^ a b "The man who was not there". Canadafreepress.com. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ a b Peter Knight (2003). Conspiracy Theories in American History: An Encyclopedia. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1576078124. ^ David B. Ottaway; Laura Clark (1989-05-11). "CIA Confident Iran Behind Jet Bombing; American Student Possibly Duped". The Washington Post. Retrieved 2009-01-07. ^ Cox, Matthew, and Foster, Tom. (1992) Their Darkest Day: The Tragedy of Pan Am 103, ISBN 0-8021-1382-6 ^ Ludwig De Braeckeleer (2008-12-31). "Tehran Hands Over the Remaining Funds to Jibril PFLP-GC". Retrieved 2009-01-07. ^ Ludwig de Braeckeleer (2008-02-05). "Lockerbie: Chronicle of a Death Foretold". Canada Free Press. Retrieved 2009-02-25. ^ "Flight 103," ABC News Prime Time Live, November 30, 1989 ^ Emerson, Steven and Duffy, Brian. (1990) The Fall of Pan Am 103: Inside the Lockerbie Investigation, ISBN 0-399-13521-9 ^ The Maltese Double Cross – Lockerbie (1994), Producer Allan Francovich ^ Thatcher, Margaret. (1993) The Downing Street Years, pp448-9 ^ Rodney Wallis (2001). Lockerbie: The Story and the Lessons. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0275964930. Retrieved 2009-02-25. ^ Rodney Wallis (2001). Lockerbie. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp. 143–147. ISBN 0275964930. ^ Micheal T. Hurley, Kenton V. Smith (2004). I Solemnly Swear. iUniverse. p. 119. ISBN 0595299474. ^ Micheal T. Hurley, Kenton V. Smith (2004). I Solemnly Swear. iUniverse. pp. 116–152. ISBN 0595299474. ^ Aviv, Juval (1989). "Interfor Report" (PDF). Interfor Inc. ^ Goddard, Donald and Coleman, Lester. (1993) Trail of the Octopus, ISBN 0-451-18184-0 ^ "Lester Coleman's ''Trail of the Octopus''". Copi.com. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ "METRO NEWS BRIEFS: NEW YORK; Informer Admits Lying In Pan Am Crash Case". New York Times. 1997-09-12. Retrieved 2009-06-24. ^ Paul Foot. "Review of Coleman's book". Druglibrary.org. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ Paul Foot (2004-03-31). "Lockerbie's dirty secret". London: The Guardian. Retrieved 2009-05-25. ^ "The DOSSIER | Video | cover-ups". Thedossier.ukonline.co.uk. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ "Internet version of ''The Maltese Double Cross - Lockerbie''". Thedossier.ukonline.co.uk. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ Marcello Mega (2005-08-28). "Police chief - Lockerbie evidence was faked". Scotland on Sunday. Retrieved 2008-11-10. ^ Townsend, Mark (June 24, 2007). "Yvonne Fletcher: the net closes in". London: The Guardian. Retrieved 2010-05-21. ^ Paul, Reynolds (2003-08-19). "UTA 772: The forgotten flight". BBC News. Retrieved 2007-03-15. ^ Devenport, Mark (2003-09-11). "Why no-one's reading the Libya dossier". BBC News. Retrieved 2007-10-10. ^ "The IRA's store of weaponry". BBC News. 2001-08-14. Retrieved 2007-10-10. ^ "UN monitor decries Lockerbie judgement". BBC News. 2002-03-14. Retrieved 2008-08-05. ^ "Libya accepts responsibility for the actions of its officials". Un.org. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ "Libya compensates terror victims". BBC News. 2008-10-31. Retrieved 2008-11-01. ^ "Police investigations of "politically sensitive" or high profile crimes" (PDF). Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ "Lockerbie trial adjourns", BBC News, 21 November 2000. Retrieved 2007-08-10. ^ "Abu Nidal 'behind Lockerbie bombing'". BBC News. 2002-08-23. Retrieved 2008-08-05. ^ Hugo Rifkind. "Abu Nidal and Gaddafi - a dangerous combination". Timesonline.co.uk. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ "Subverting America : A Trojan Horse Legacy" by Rodney Stich. Books.google.co.uk. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ Radio detonation theory ^ "Microsoft Word - 503158" (PDF). Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch (2003). Global Intelligence. Zed Books. ISBN 1842771132. ^ "Bomb positioned "close to the fuselage"". Web.archive.org. Retrieved 2010-06-05. ^ Joe Vialls (2002-02-12). "Pulsed-Strobe "Less Than Lethal" Weapon at The Ritz". Retrieved 2009-02-25. ^ Patrick Haseldine (1989-12-07). "Finger of suspicion". The Guardian. Retrieved 2009-05-25. ^ Guy Arnold (1996). The Maverick State: Gaddafi and the New World Order. Cassell. ISBN 0304333662. Retrieved 2009-02-25. ^ David Tucker (1994-11-12). "S. Africa Minister Denies Knowing of Lockerbie Bomb". Reuters. Retrieved 2009-02-25. ^ "Shadow over Lockerbie - Mass Murder Over Scotland". Americanradioworks.publicradio.org. Retrieved 2010-06-05.
Britain's Jack Straw, France's Philippe Douste-Blazy and Germany's Joschka Fischer want sanctions sept 2005.
|Softening Up Iran for the Final Attack Wayne MADSEN (USA) | 30.12.2011 | 00:00|
|Softening Up Iran for the Final Attack Wayne MADSEN
(USA) | 30.12.2011 | 00:00
In many ways, America's and Israel's much-anticipated war against Iran has already begun. It is not the type of war that was expected -- an Israeli textbook style surprise and swift attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, followed by a sustained U.S. and NATO air campaign -- but a covert war with quite an unexpected feature. The covert war, which has seen increased U.S. drone activity over Iranian skies and an increase in suspicious explosions at Iranian military facilities, has been coupled with American support for destabilization efforts against all of Iran's allies and friends, including Syria, Russia, China, North Korea, and Venezuela…
This multi-pronged attack strategy has sent a clear message to Iran, it is not safe from covert sabotage at home and it cannot look to its friends abroad for help as they deal with their own U.S. and Israeli-inspired domestic strife.
Although Libya under Muammar Qaddafi was no friend of Iran, the coming to power of pro-Saudi Wahhabi Salafist-Sunni elements in Tripoli and Benghazi increases the phalanx of Arab states actively opposing the Shi'a government in Tehran. The success of the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist parties in Egypt's parliamentary election also spells problems for Iran.
However, it is the potential loss of power by the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria that poses the worst immediate defeat for Iran. Syria has been Iran's closest ally in the Arab world. The West and the Saudis and Qataris have been supporting Salafist elements, including terrorists, who have committed their own share of atrocities in Syria, much as the same ilk conducted massacres of pro-Qaddafi, as well as black African guest workers and black Libyans, during the Libyan civil war.
On Iran's borders and adjacent waters, countries hosting U.S. military forces -- Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, Turkey, and Afghanistan -- are being prepared for a military conflict with Iran. Although the Obama administration proclaimed the end of the U.S. military occupation of Iraq, some U.S. forces remain in the country, as well as a group of para-military private security contractors.
With news that Iraq that the predominantly Shi'a and pro-Iranian Nouri al Maliki government in Baghdad has forged a military alliance with Iran and that Iraq's Sunni Vice President, Tareq al-Hashimy, has sought protection from arrest by Maliki's government in Iraqi Kurdistan, the U.S. can be expected to increase its own covert and overt military presence in Iraqi "Sunnistan" in the west of the country, as well as in Iraqi Kurdistan. The first front lines in a U.S. and/or Israel military showdown with Iran could be along the Shi'a-Sunni front lines in Iraq, a nation already so weary and decimated from war.
Iranian Revolutionary Guard forces could end up crossing into Iraq to take on remaining U.S. forces and their Sunni and Kurdish proxies.
The U.S. has pressured Maliki to not take action against the 3,400 Iranian exiles, most of them Mujaheddin-e-Khalq guerrillas, who were once backed by Saddam Hussein. The anti-Tehran regime MEK forces now enjoy the backing of a number of U.S. politicians but they are considered terrorists by Tehran. Since the U.S. occupation of Iraq, the MEK refugees have been under siege at Camp Ashraf. The U.S. has pressured Maliki to allow the Iranians to be resettled at Camp Liberty, near Baghdad, prior to exfiltration from Iraq by the United States. No final agreement between Washington and Baghdad has been signed but the MEK loyalists could end up in one of the Gulf states and be available for future guerrilla operations inside Iran.
The other wild card in any future U.S. is Pakistan, which now has a fractured relationship with Washington after incessant U.S. drone attacks have killed Pakistani border troops and a number of civilians. Pakistan's corrupt President, Ali Asraf Zardari, the widower of Benazir Bhutto, is seen as a lame duck. Just as with George Soros and U.S. National Endowment FOR Democracy (NED) "themed" rebellions currently being waged fomented against Iran's diplomatic allies and economic and military partners Russia and China, Pakistan, the Muslim world's only nuclear power, is experiencing a "people's" uprising led by cricket star-turned-politician Imran Khan.
Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice, PTI) recently saw over 100,000 turn out for a rally in Karachi, where the protesters called for political and economic reforms and an end to the corruption practiced by Zardari and his cronies. The message is similar to the anti-Vladimir Putin forces in Moscow -- anti-corruption and the institution of political reforms. Even the number of protesters is the same between the last protest against Putin in Moscow and the anti-Zardari protest in Karachi: 100,000.
However, Khan is supported by Pakistan's educated and professional, mostly young, elite. His ex-wife is London socialite Jemima Goldsmith Khan, a covert to Islam, who is related to the Rothschild family. Although she divorced Khan in 2004, Jemima Khan supports the goals of her ex-husband's PTI movement. The PTI is beginning to gain political support in Pakistan from some former members and officials of Zardari's Pakistan People's Party, an indication that Khan is expanding his base.
Jemima Khan also posted the bail for WikiLeaks's Julian Assange, a clear indication that Khan's movement is as close to the same Soros-NED-CIA "cognitive infiltration and dissidence" construct applied in a number of other countries.
Khan has had to take on an anti-American tone by condemning drone strikes and the U.S. military presence in Pakistan. However, Khan, to be a contender for power, must tack to a nationalist line because America is hated by a wide cross-section of the Pakistani population. Khan is adopting the same wishy-washy political platform that Barack Obama adopted in 2008, even borrowing from the Obama campaign by using "Hope" and "Change" campaign materials throughout Pakistan and even borrowing from another Obama campaign slogan with a slight twist: "Yes We Khan."
U.S. drone unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drone activity, using intelligence-collection and weaponized drones, can be expected to continue. notwithstanding Iran's capture of a sophisticated jet-powered RQ0170 Sentinel drone that was brought down in Iran. In addition, it is strongly rumored that Israel may have drone and other intelligence bases from which to operate against Iran in Azerbaijan on Iran's northern border. The United States, Britain, and Israel are suspected of being behind covert attacks -- physical and cyber -- against Iran's nuclear development program.
Iranian nuclear scientists and defense officials have been assassinated and kidnapped by Western intelligence agents operating within Iran and abroad. There have been mysterious devastating explosions at an Iranian missile production facility outside of Tehran and at a nuclear facility near Isfahan. The West is also using Iranian minority guerrilla groups to conduct operations inside Iran, including Iranian Arabs in the southwest, Kurds in the north, and Baluchis in the southeast.
Although UAV activity against Iran has been widely reported, the use of Unmanned Undersea Vehicles (UUVs) against Iran's naval forces, currently conducting a major exercise in the Gulf, cannot be discounted. The U.S. Navy may be using UUVs to conduct targeting activities inside Iran's Bandar Abbas naval base on the Gulf and in the near future may see UUVs conducting sabotage of Iranian naval vessels and in counteracting Iranian mines by blowing them up.
Israel is also known to maintain two of its Dolphin class diesel electric submarines in the Gulf. The submarines carry cruise missiles that are likely tipped with nuclear warheads.
Meanwhile, no stone is being left unturned by the West in neutralizing Iran's support from allies. In addition to supporting themed rebellions against Russia and China, so-called "White" revolutions, Iran's friend in Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, is facing charges that he and Iranian personnel are developing nuclear weapons in Venezuela, an old and totally-debunked charge, and that Venezuelans and Lebanese Hezbollah are involved in drug smuggling in Mexico. The latter fairy tale is courtesy of the Spanish-language news network Univision, owned by notorious Israeli-American Hollywood mogul Chaim Saban, a Zionist who bankrolls the Saban Center at the Brookings Institution. The Saban Center also provides propagandists from its satellite office in Doha, Qatar to influence the Fox News-style propaganda, masked as "news," that emanates from the Doha studios of Al Jazeera.
Iran's Lebanese Hezbollah allies and the governments of Sudan and North Korea, known to be close to Tehran, are facing renewed pressure from the West, especially North Korea after the unexpected death of Kim Jong Il. With rumors in Seoul and Beijing that Kim Jong Il may have been assassinated by military officers in a power struggle that led to a coup, North Korea as a source for Iranian missiles and nuclear technology may now be in doubt. Sudan, which already lost South Sudan to a pro-Israeli regime, is now facing the possibility that Darfur and North Kordofan could be peeled away from the country, leaving a powerless rump regime in Khartoum.
In the U.S., the Zionist propagandists are spinning the fanciful tale that Iran was involved with "Al Qaeda," the fairy tale organization concocted by Mossad and the CIA, in carrying out the 9/11 attacks.
One fact remains. Iran is now facing an undeclared war being waged by the West and Israel. It is a war of computer viruses like the Israeli-developed Stuxnet, propaganda, support for armed insurgents, covert assassinations and sabotage, and political pressure against Iran's friends around the world. This softening up of Iran is expected by the West to make a final military assault on the country a "cake walk."
|Iran: the next war, John Pilger Monday 13th February 2006|
|Exerpt from: Iran: the next war, John Pilger Monday 13th February 2006
http://www.newstatesman.com/200602130008 "While the Pentagon has no
plans to occupy all of Iran, it has in its sights a strip of land that
runs along the border with Iraq. This is Khuzestan, home to 90 per cent of
Iran's oil. "The first step taken by an invading force,"
reported Beirut's Daily Star, "would be to occupy Iran's oil-rich
Khuzestan Province, securing the sensitive Straits of Hormuz and cutting
off the Iranian military's oil supply." On 28 January the Iranian
government said that it had evidence of British undercover attacks in
Khuzestan, including bombings, over the past year. Will the newly
emboldened Labour MPs pursue this? Will they ask what the British army
based in nearby Basra - notably the SAS - will do if or when Bush begins
bombing Iran? With control of the oil of Khuzestan and Iraq and, by proxy,
Saudi Arabia, the US will have what Richard Nixon called "the
greatest prize of all".
But what of Iran's promise of "a crushing response"? Last year, the Pentagon delivered 500 "bunker-busting" bombs to Israel. Will the Israelis use them against a desperate Iran? Bush's 2002 Nuclear Posture Review cites "pre-emptive" attack with so-called low-yield nuclear weapons as an option. Will the militarists in Washington use them, if only to demonstrate to the rest of us that, regardless of their problems with Iraq, they are able to "fight and win multiple, simultaneous major-theatre wars", as they have boasted? That a British prime minister should collude with even a modicum of this insanity is cause for urgent action on this side of the Atlantic."
|CSIS Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities.pdf|
|Analyzing the Impact of Preventive Strikes Against Iran’s Nuclear
Facilities September 4th, 2012 1800 K Street, NW Suite 400 Washington,
DC 20006 Phone: 1.202.775.3270 Fax: 1.202.775.3199 Email: firstname.lastname@example.org
Web: www.csis.org/burke/reports Anthony H. Cordesman, Arleigh A. Burke
Chair in Strategy and Abdullah Toukan 2 This report is based on a series
of reports by Dr. Anthony Cordesman on Iran, published by the Burke
Chair, CSIS. They can be found at: • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance
- Part One: Conventional and Asymmetric Forces, available on the CSIS
web site at http://csis.org/publication/reassessing-gulf-military-balance-part-oneconventional-
and-asymmetric-forces. • Iran and the Gulf Military Balance II: The
Missile and Nuclear Dimensions, available on the CSIS web site at
dimensions. Professor Anthony H. Cordesman can be reached at email@example.com
Dr. Abdullah Toukan can be contacted at: firstname.lastname@example.org
Strategic Analysis and Global Risk Assessment (SAGRA) Center Abu Dhabi
UAE 9/6/2012 Page Executive Summary 4 US Perception of the Iranian
Threat 10 The Military Option to Deal with Iran’s Nuclear Program 15
Illustrative U.S. Preventive Military Strikes 18 Countering Iran’s Air
Defense 29 GCC vs Iran Airforce Comparison 33 Iran’s Missile Force 44
U.S. & GCC Defense against Iranian Ballistic Missiles 56 Countering
Iranian attacks on the Straits of Hormuz 64 Military Strike Israel:
Scenario I 81 Military Strike Israel: Scenario II 89 US Simulation
Results on the Consequences of an Israeli Strike 92 Appendix 95 3
Executive Summary Executive Summary • Over the past couple of months,
speculation about a U.S. or Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities
has made headlines around the globe. This report addresses how the U.S.
could take the lead in carrying out a preventive Military Strike against
Iran If all peaceful options have been exhausted and Iran has left no
other means to convince it to stop or change its course in pursuing
nuclear weapons . It also examines how the US could provide a defense
umbrella against any Iranian air and missile retaliation that would be
aimed at U.S. military targets and allies in the region, in particular
the GCC states. • A key question arises is what should the objectives of
a military strike be? To halt the Iranian nuclear program? To set it
back five years or for one year? This criteria is the key to defining
the force allocation required to achieve a successful mission against
Iran’s nuclear facilities. • The study shows that the initial strike
should be against key Iranian nuclear enrichment and research
facilities, ballistic missile basis located around the country, numerous
mobile ballistic missile launchers dispersed around Iran and main
ballistic missile production facilities. At the same time, it shows that
the payloads required to hit underground enrichment facilities with a
high level of damage, to carry out the scale of initial and follow-up
attacks, and providing resources such as near real time intelligence
required to detect and destroy other potentially lethal Iranian military
weapons, for instance ballistic missiles that could be used in a
retaliation, can only be carried out by the United States. • An initial
U.S. strike will require a large force allocation consisting of
Defensive Counterair and Offensive Counterair Operations, such as the
main Bomber Force, the Suppression of Enemy Air Defense System, Escort
aircraft for the protection of the Bombers, Electronic Warfare for
detection and jamming purposes, Fighter Sweep and Combat Air Patrol to
counter any air retaliation by Iran. • While such first strike will try
to be as effective as possible, the U.S. would be the only country that
has the air power, support capability, and mix of sea-air forces in the
Gulf to continue a sustained campaign over a period of time and restrike
after an initial battle damage assessment it is found that further
strike sorties are required. Several other key points are made in the
analysis: • The aging Iranian airforce will definitely be no match
against the U.S. and even the GCC airforces. In addition the Iranian Air
Defense systems do not have the Command Control Communications and
Intelligence required to detect, track and shoot down the US advanced
military combat aircraft. However U.S. planners will definitely take all
operational planning precautions necessary to ensure that both the
Iranian Airforce and Air Defense system are ineffective and all U.S.
combat aircraft have a high probability of survival throughout. • U.S.
officials are working with allies in the Gulf to develop the capability
to defeat the threat Iran poses to the Gulf, allied territory, and the
flow of trade and energy exports GCC countries worry that during a
crisis, Iran could try to prevent their ships from traversing the Strait
of Hormuz, cutting off their oil export business. • The only effective
counter-strike capability Iran has other than asymmetric warfare in the
Gulf, and the use of proxies like Hezbollah, is their Ballistic Missile
Force. A massive retaliation strike with whatever launching sites that
have survived the U.S. first strike could still cause quite a
considerable damage to the GCC states, in energy, finance and various
other critical infrastructure centers. • The U.S. is currently involved
in building a Defensive Shield against a massive Iranian Ballistic
Missile attack targeted at the GCC states. The defensive shield consists
of a Multi-Tier Ballistic Missile Defense System consisting of Terminal
High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) and Patriot Advanced Capability,
PAC-3, missile systems supported with the most advanced Radar and
Command and Control facilities. • Ballistic missile defense (BMD)
systems have been provided to Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar
and Oman, as well as stationing Aegis-equipped warships in the waters of
the Arabian Gulf. The U.S. has been developing an integrated early
warning radar system across the GCC states that could help U.S. and GCC
forces to quickly respond to an Iranian missile attack. . • Israel does
not have the capability to carry out preventive strikes that could do
more than delay Iran’s efforts for a year or two. • Finally, the fact
that US has the capability to carry out preventive strikes does not mean
it should not seek to negotiate an end to the threatening aspects of
Iran’s nuclear programs. The brief shows just how dangerous any war in
the Gulf could be to the world’s economy – although Iran is more
vulnerable than any of its Southern Gulf neighbors. • The U.S. also
needs its Gulf allies as key partners and must consider the “law of
unintended consequences.” Preventive military strikes could push the
presently volatile middle east region into a war with far reaching
global political, military, and economic consequences. US Preventive
Military Strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities and Ballistic Missile
Bases Panchin Fordow Arak Natanz Esfahan Ballistic Missile Bases Tabriz
Bakhtaran Imam Ali Semnan Space & Missile Center Mashhad Airbase Bandar
Abbas Kuhestak Abu Musa Island • 5 Main Nuclear Facilities • 8 Ballistic
Missile Bases • 15 Ballistic Missile Production Facilities Combat
Aircraft Strike Force could be F-18’s off the U.S. 5th fleet, and F-15E
launched from Forward Area Bases. The Combat Aircraft can also perform
all Offensive Counterair Operations : Fighter Sweep, SEAD (suppression
of Enemy Air Defense), Interdiction and Escort. B-2 Mission Payload is
the B-57 A/B Mission Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). (Location of Facilities
source: NTI) Iran Saudi Arabia Iraq UAE Google Nuclear Facilities Kuwait
Qatar B-2 Bombers Strike Force Combat Aircraft Strike Force Two Tier
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) – THAAD & PAC 3 Endo and Exo-Atmospheric
Engagements using Shoot-Look-Shoot & Hit-to-Kill THAAD Launcher PAC-3
Launcher Upper Tier 1st Intercept Upper Tier 2nd Intercept
Shoot-Look-Shoot Lower Tier 1st Intercept Lower Tier 2nd Intercept UAE
Qatar IRAN Saudi Arabia TBMD System Defense against THAAD : UAE SRBMs
(<1000 km) and MRBMs (1000 - 3000 km) PAC-3 : UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia
SRBMs (300 – 1000 km) Missile Launch Arabian Gulf Shoot-Look-Shoot
Qatar: Missile Early Warning Radar Mid-Course Phase Need to destroy as
many Missile Launchers as possible, pre-boost phase, in order to reduce
number of incoming warheads. US Perceptions of the Iranian Threat The
Military Power of Iran: The Official US View Annual Report on Military
Power of Iran Report by U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, June 2012
Iranian Grand Strategy, Security Strategy, and Military Strategy • There
has been no change to Iran's strategies over the past year. Iran's grand
strategy remains challenging U.S. influence while developing its
domestic capabilities to become the dominant power in the Middle East.
Iran's security strategy remains focused on deterring an attack, and it
continues to support governments and groups that oppose U,S. interests.
Diplomacy, economic leverage, and active sponsorship of terrorist and
insurgent groups, such as Lebanese Hizballah, Iraqi Shia groups, and the
Taliban, are tools Iran uses to increase its regional power. Iran's
principles of military strategy remain deterrence, asymmetrical
retaliation, and attrition warfare. • Iran seeks to increase its stature
by countering U.S. influence and expanding ties with regional actors
while advocating Islamic solidarity. Iran also desires to expand
economic and security agreements with other nations, particularly
members of the Nonaligned Movement in Latin America and Africa. • With
the advent of the Arab Spring in 2011, Iran saw opportunities to
increase its influence by supporting groups opposed to regimes in power,
particularly those perceived to support U.S. interests. Iran publicized
its belief that these popular, democratic uprisings were inspired by its
own 1979 Islamic Revolution. Source: Annual Report on Military Power of
Iran April 2012, Full Update June 29. Report by U.S. Defense Secretary
Leon Panetta for four congressional defense committees to comply with a
fiscal 2010 directive to provide an annual classified and unclassified
assessment of Iran’s military power.] http://media.bloomberg.com/bb/avfile/rNnp87SL4Ew8
[Provided by Bloomberg News : • Outside the Middle East Iran's efforts
to expand political, economic, and security ties with a range of
countries demonstrate Tehran' s desire to offset sanctions and
diplomatic isolation. Iran continues to use a multipronged strategy in
Iraq, including engagement with leaders across the political spectrum,
outreach to the Iraqi populace, and continued support to Iraqi Shia
militants and terrorists, such as Kataib Hizballah, Asaib Ahl al-Haq,
and the Promised Day Brigade, in the wake of the U.S. military
withdrawal. Iran provides money, weapons, training, and strategic and
operational guidance to Shia militias and terrorist groups to protect
and preserve Iran's security interests, including threatening the
residual U.S presence. In addition to providing arms and support, the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). is responsible
for training Iraqi militants and terrorists in Iran, sometimes using
Lebanese Hizballah instructors. • Iran continues to influence events in
Afghanistan through a multifaceted approach, including support for the
Karzai government while also supporting various insurgent groups. Tehran
maintains ties with Afghan leaders across the political spectrum and
continues to be involved in a number of humanitarian, economic, and
cultural outreach activities among the Afghan populace. Although
Tehran's support to the Taliban is inconsistent with their historic
enmity, it complements Iran's strategy of backing many groups to
maximize its influence while also undermining U.S. and North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) objectives by fomenting violence. • Iran has
been involved in Lebanon since the early days of the Islamic Republic,
especially seeking to expand ties with the country s large Shia
]population. The IRGC-QF continues to provide money, weapons, training,
and logistic support to Lebanese Hizballah and views the organization as
a key tool in its efforts to pressure Israel. • Since the beginning of
the Syrian unrest, Iran has supported President Bashar al-Asad while
downplaying the depth of this support in public. Iran's support to the
Asad regime has included military equipment and communications
assistance. Iran probably has provided military trainers to advise
Syrian security forces. Iran's Conventional Forces • Iran's conventional
military capabilities continue to improve, Naval forces are adding new
ships and submarines while expanding bases on the Gulf of Oman, the
Persian Gulf, and the Caspian Sea. In addition, Iran continues to expand
the breadth of its naval operations. Iran deploys naval ships into the
Gulf of Aden and Arabian Sea for counter piracy operations and in 2011
and early 2012 deployed two separate surface groups to the
Mediterranean. • In early 2012, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
Ground Resistance Forces (IRGCGRF) conducted a series of exercises in
northeastern and central Iran. The exercises, MARTYRS OF UNITY in the
northeast and SUPPORTERS OF VELAYAT and VALFAJR in central Iran, were
the first significant exercises conducted by the IRGCGRF since its
reorganization in 2008. The three exercises consisted of combined-arms
maneuvers and were meant to show the !RGCGRF's offensive and defensive
capabilities while offering limited training value for the participating
units. Iran's Unconventional Forces and Related Activities • Through the
IRGC-QF, Iran provides material support to terrorist or militant groups
such as HAMAS, Lebanese Hizballah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the
Taliban, and Iraqi Shia groups. • In close cooperation with Syria, Iran
has provided Lebanese Hizballah with increasingly sophisticated weapons,
including a wide array of missiles and rockets that allow Hizballah to
launch weapons from deeper in Lebanon or to strike Israel. We judge that
the Iranian military trains Hizballah and Palestinian extremist groups
at camps throughout the region. • Iran provides funding and possibly
weapons to HAMAS and other Palestinian terrorists in the Gaza Strip.
Iranian Capabilities Related to Nuclear and Missile Forces • Iran is
developing a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to
the production of nuclear weapons if the decision is made to do so. It
continues to progress with its uranium enrichment at Natanz and the
newly operational Qom 'Enrichment Facility despite UN Security Council
sanctions, The International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEAs) November
2011 report on Iran provided extensive evidence of past and possibly
ongoing Iranian nuclear weapons- related research and development work.
Iran has refused to address this evidence and denied repeated IAEA
requests for access to documents, personnel, and facilities. • At the
Natanz Underground Fuel Enrichment Plant, as of February 2012, Iran was
producing 3.5-percent lowenriched uranium hexafluoride (LEUF6) with
about 8,800 of the 9,150 installed IR-1l centrifuges. At the Natanz
Aboveground Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant, Iran was producing 20-percent
LEUF6 with one interconnected cascade pair (328 centrifuges). About
6,200 empty IR-1 centrifuge casings were installed in that facility. At
the Qom Enrichment Facility (aka the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant), Iran
was producing 2O-percent LEUF6 with two pairs of interconnected cascades
(about 700 IR-1 centrifuges). Iran had filled the remainder of the
facility’s centrifuge capacity with 2,100 empty IR-1 centrifuge casings.
Iran declared the entire facility would be used for producing LEUF6,
abandoning previous plans to conduct centrifuge research and development
there. • Iran continued construction at the heavy-water Iran Nuclear
Research Reactor (IR-40) at Khondab in violation of UN resolutions.
Regular Iranian ballistic missile training continues throughout the
country. • Iran continues to develop ballistic missiles that can range
regional adversaries, Israel, and Eastern Europe, including an
extended-range variant of the Shahab-3 and a 2,0OO-km medium-range
ballistic missile, the Ashura. Beyond steady growth in its missile and
rocket inventories, Iran has boosted the lethality and effectiveness of
existing systems with accuracy improvements and new submunition
payloads. Iran’s missile force consists chiefly of mobile missile
launchers that are not tethered to specific physical launch positions.
Iran may be technically capable of flight testing an intercontinental
ballistic missile by 2015.” The Military Option to Deal with Iran’s
Nuclear Program US Extended Deterrence against the proliferation of WMD
and their delivery systems. • The U.S. sees Iran with its ballistic
missiles and potential of developing a nuclear weapon is a direct threat
to the GCC and also poses a threat to all friends and allies in the
Middle east region. • Iran has ignored U.S. warnings and has pressed
ahead with its uranium-enrichment program and has recently announced
that it is “self-sufficient” in nuclear technology. Iran claims that it
can domestically produce its own raw uranium for enrichment. • The U.S.
administration has stated that the full range of U.S. military
capability in both conventional and unconventional weapons will be
available and ready to be committed to defending its allies and friends
against any threat. The U.S. has started implementing a strategy to
influence the decision-making bodies in Iran as to the devastating
consequences if the GCC, and any other allies are attacked or
threatened. • Citing the Iranian threat, the Obama administration
shifted from the Bush administration’s plans to place missile-defense
sites in Poland and radar in the Czech Republic to an approach that
would in four phases place closer to Iran some Aegis-class Navy missile
defense vessels, ground radar and eventually land- based Navy Standard
Missile-3 interceptors • Should deterrence fail, the U.S. will have
already provided the GCC countries with Ballistic Missile Defense
Systems which have all the Early Warning and Command Control facilities.
This will limit the damage should they be attacked, and to enhance the
conventional deterrence capability of the GCC. In addition providing
modern technology combat aircraft that can be launched within a very
short window of time to block any first attack wave and to have the
capability to move the war into enemy territory, in the shortest time
period, using both Defensive and Offensive Counterair Missions. •
Ballistic missile defense (BMD) systems have been provided to four
countries on the Arabian Peninsula. BMD systems were provided to Kuwait,
the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Oman, as well as stationing BMD
capable, Aegis-equipped warships in the waters of the Arabian Gulf. •
The U.S. has been developing an integrated early warning radar system
across the GCC states that could help U.S. and GCC forces to quickly
respond to an Iranian missile attack. The moves are intended to reassure
Gulf countries that they would be protected against possible offensive
action from Tehran. U.S. officials stressed the defensive nature of the
actions being taken throughout the region. • U.S. officials also are
working with allies in the Gulf to ensure freedom of navigation in the
region. Arab countries worry that during a crisis, Iran could try to
prevent their ships from traversing the Strait of Hormuz, cutting off
their oil export business. US officials have repeatedly insisted they
are keeping "all options on the table," which includes a military strike
option, when it comes to Iran. Secretary of State Clinton made the
following remarks with Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister on March 31, 2012
(US State Department). • “We believe strongly that, in addition to our
bilateral military cooperation between the United States and every
member nation of the GCC, we can do even more to defend the Gulf through
cooperation on ballistic missile defense. We began that conversation in
this forum today. Admiral Fox, the commander of the Fifth Fleet, made a
presentation outlining some of the challenges that we face when it comes
to ballistic missile defense. But we are committed to defending the Gulf
nations and we want it to be as effective as possible. • So we want to
begin expert discussions with our friends about what we can do to
enhance ballistic missile defense. There are some aspects of a ballistic
missile defense system that are already available, some of which have
already been deployed in the Gulf. But it’s the cooperation – it’s what
they call interoperability that we now need to really roll up our
sleeves and get to work on.” 17 Illustrative U.S. Preventive Military
Strikes 18 • The U.S. is the only country that can launch a successful
Military Strike, if all peaceful options have been exhausted and Iran
has left no other means to convince it to stop or change its course in
pursuing Nuclear Weapons. The U.S. should alone determine what the
timeline could be if Iran does pursue the path to develop nuclear
weapons. • The question arises is what would the objectives of a
military strike be? To pull the Iranian nuclear program back 5 years or
delay it for 1 year? This criteria will define the force allocation
required to achieve a successful mission against Iran’s nuclear
facilities. We point out that it is not a simple mission of bombers
flying in and out of Iran, this is a complicated Offensive Air Strike
that will involve many aircraft, each with its own role, such as Combat
Aircarft whose role is to suppress enemy air defenses along the way,
aircraft that fly fighter escort with the bombers, aircraft that carry
specialized electronic warfare equipment to jam enemy radars and
communications., plus probably air-to-air refueling along the way in and
out of Iran. • Depending on the forces allocated and duration of air
strikes, it is unlikely that an air campaign alone could alone terminate
Iran’s program. The possibility of dispersed facilities complicates any
assessment of a potential mission success, making it unclear what the
ultimate effect of a strike would be on Iran’s nuclear facilities. • The
U.S. is aware that the action of a military strike could be
destabilizing for the entire Middle East region and potentially generate
a nuclear weapons race in that part of the world," Admiral Michael
Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told CNN. "I think an
attack would also be, by us or by anybody else, be very destabilizing.
Military Risks in Strike against Iran’s Nuclear Facilities 19
Illustrative US Strike Mission • B-2 bombers out of Diego Garcia, each
carrying 2 GBU-57 MOP bombs. • Mission can be achieved with a high
success rate also maintaining a sustained strike over a couple of days.
• B-2 bombers escorted by F-18s from the 5th fleet stationed in the Gulf
area, or F-15Es and F-16Cs from forward area air bases. • United States
and Western allies considered to be the only countries involved, no GCC
or any Arab country involvement and especially no-Israeli direct
involvement. • Still though, Iran most probably will accuse Israel to be
part of the Strike and will try to retaliate, either by launching a
Ballistic Missile on Israel carrying conventional or WMD (chemical,
biological, radiological) and activating Hezbullah to launch cross
border attacks against Israel. • Iran would also try to attack any U.S.
military airbases that are active in the Gulf even if they are stationed
in GCC countries. • If Iran attacks any of the GCC countries, then they
will have the right to self-defense. In addition the whole Arab Middle
East will not accept an Iranian attack on any of the GCC countries. 20
The B-2 Bomber Primary Function Multi role heavy bomber Engines: Four GE
F-118-GE-100 engines, each with a thrust of 17,300 pounds (7,847 kg)
Speed, Cruise: High subsonic Ceiling: 50,000 ft (15,000 meters) Weight
Takeoff, (typical): 335,500 – 350,000 pounds (152,600 – 159,000 kg)
Weight, Empty (typical): 125,000 – 160,000 pounds Range: 6,000 nmi
(9,600 km), unrefueled range for a Hi-Lo-Hi mission with 16 B61 nuclear
free-fall bombs 10,000 miles with one aerial refueling. Payload: 40,000
pounds (18,000 kg) Crew: Two pilots Current Armament: Nuclear: 16 B61,
16 B83 Conventional: 80 MK82 (500lb), 16 MK84 (2000lb), 34-36 CBU-87,
34-36 CBU- 89, 34-36 CBU-97 Precision: 216 GBU-39 SDB (250 lb), 80
GBU-30 JDAM (500 lb), 16 GBU-32 JDAM (2000 lb), GBU-27, GBU-28, GBU-36,
GBU-37, AGM-154 HSOW, 8-16 AGM-137 TSSAM, 2 MOP / DSHTW/ Big BLU
(Source: http://www.GlobalSecurity.org/wmd/systems/b-2-s[ecs.html) 21
GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) Specifications Weight, total
13,600 kg (slightly less than 30,000 pounds) Weight, explosive 2,700 kg
(6,000 lb) Length 6m / 20.5 feet Diameter 31.5 in diameter Control
Short-span wings and trellis-type tail Penetration 60 meters (200ft)
through 5,000 psi reinforced concrete 40 meters (125 ft) through
moderately hard rock 8 meters (25 feet) through 10,000 psi reinforced
concrete Contractors Boeing, Northrop Grumman Platforms B-52, B2
Guidance GPS aided Inertial Navigation System • In July 2009,
verification of equipment required to integrate the MOP on the B-2 was
complete - the hardware that holds the MOP inside the weapons bay. The
MOP is a GPS-guided weapon containing more than 5,300 pounds of
conventional explosives inside a 20.5 ft long bomb body of hardened
steel. It is designed to penetrate dirt, rock and reinforced concrete to
reach enemy bunker or tunnel installations. The B-2 will be capable of
carrying two MOPs, one in each weapons bay. • The B-2 currently carries
up to 40,000 pounds of conventional ordnance. For example, it can
deliver 80 independently targeted 500-lb class bombs from its smart bomb
rack assembly; or up to 16 2,000-lb class weapons from its rotary
launcher. Integration of the MOP on the B-2 is the latest in a series of
modernization programs that Northrop Grumman and its subcontractors have
undertaken with the Air Force to ensure that the aircraft remains fully
capable against evolving threats. 22 (Source: http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/delivery-systems/)
Priority Targets in addition to Iran’s Main Nuclear Nuclear Facilities
U.S. Military Strike Force Allocation against Iran’s Nuclear and
Ballistic Facilities Offensive Counterair (OCA) Mission Performance
Criteria and Mission Parameters: • A damage performance criteria above
75% for each target, nuclear and missile, resulting in a delay of at
least 5 to 10 years in Iran’s Nuclear Program, and substantially
weakening Iran’s ballistic missile retaliatory capability. • Two
aircraft are allocated to each target to maximize the damage on First
Strike. • Destroying the maximum number of Missile Bases, Mobile
Launchers and Production Facilities during (boost Phase) or before
Launch, thereby reducing the number of incoming missiles (warheads) and
also reducing the number of shots defense needs to take at each Incoming
warhead. Iran Target Number of Targets Aircraft Allocated Main Nuclear 5
Facilities 2 A/C per target resulting in 10 B-2 Bombers Missiles Bases 8
Bases 2 A/C per base resulting in 16 Strike A/C Missile Production 15
Facilities 2 A/C per target resulting in 30 Strike A/C Mobile Missile
Launchers Assuming 22 Launchers in various locations 2 A/C per mobile
launcher resulting in 44 A/C TOTAL 50 10 B-2 Bombers 90 Strike Aircraft
= 100 25 En Route SEAD Attack Operations Offensive Counterair Missions (OCA)
CAP (Source: Counterair Operations USAF AFDD 2-1.1 October 1, 2008)
Attack Operations • Attack operations are intended to destroy, disrupt,
or degrade counterair targets on the ground. •These missions are
directed against enemy: Ballistic Missile Sites Airfields Command
Control and their support infrastructure: Suppression of Enemy Air
Defenses (SEAD) SEAD is an OCA mission designed to neutralize, destroy,
or degrade enemy surface-based air defenses by destructive or disruptive
means. Fighter Sweep: An offensive mission by fighter aircraft to seek
and destroy enemy aircraft or targets of opportunity in a designated
area. Escorts: Escorts are aircraft assigned to protect other aircraft
during a mission. Escort missions are flown over enemy territory to
target and engage enemy aircraft and air defense systems. Decrease in
Aircraft Required in an Air-to-Ground Strike Mission: • Improved Weapons
Accuracy • Increased Survivability • Larger Payload Additional
requirements to increase Mission Effectiveness The effectiveness of OCA
operations depends on the availability of certain resources. System
capabilities are influenced by the situation, threats, weather, and
available intelligence. The following are some of the resources used to
conduct OCA: Aircraft: Fighter and bomber aircraft provide the bulk of
the weapon systems for OCA operations. Other types of aircraft and
weapon systems are often critical enablers of counterair operations
(e.g., electronic attack, electronic protection, and air refueling
aircraft). Missiles: These weapons include surface-to-surface,
air-to-surface, and air-to-air missiles, as well as air-, land-, and
sealaunched cruise missiles. Many of these weapons have long ranges and
some have very quick reaction times. These weapon systems can eliminate
or reduce the risk of harm to friendly forces by destroying enemy
systems in the air and on the ground. ISR Systems: ISR systems and
resources may be used in counterair operations to provide intelligence,
surveillance, reconnaissance, deception, and other effects against enemy
forces and air defense systems. These activities include the use of
airborne, space-borne, and ground (e.g., human intelligence) assets.
(Source: Counterair Operations USAF AFDD 2-1.1 October 1, 2008) Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS): UAS may be used in counterair operations to
provide ISR, deception, jamming, harassment, or destruction of enemy
forces and air defense systems. These systems may be preprogrammed or
remotely piloted. They provide valuable intelligence to friendly forces
and may now be used to attack some targets either too dangerous or risky
for manned aircraft or where manned aircraft are not present or
available to respond. They may also be used to help provide persistent
air presence over enemy forces in situations where this may have
important psychological effects upon an adversary (as part of OCA or
other operations) if synergistically tasked to help provide persistent
presence over adversary forces. Special Operations Forces (SOF): SOF can
conduct direct action missions, special reconnaissance, and provide
terminal guidance for attacks against valuable enemy targets. Planners
in the AOC coordinate with the special operations liaison element to
coordinate the use of special operations assets in support of the
counterair mission. C2 Systems: These systems enhance OCA operations by
providing early warning, intelligence, identification, and targeting
data, as well as C2 of friendly forces. (Source: Counterair Operations
USAF AFDD 2-1.1 October 1, 2008) US Preventive Military Strike against
Iranian Nuclear Facilities and Ballistic Missile Bases Panchin Fordow
Arak Natanz Esfahan Ballistic Missile Bases Tabriz Bakhtaran Imam Ali
Semnan Space & Missile Center Mashhad Airbase Bandar Abbas Kuhestak Abu
Musa Island • 5 Main Nuclear Facilities • 8 Ballistic Missile Bases • 15
Ballistic Missile Production Facilities Combat Aircraft Strike Force
could be F-18’s off the U.S. 5th fleet, and F-15E launched from Forward
Area Bases. The Combat Aircraft can also perform all Offensive
Counterair Operations : Fighter Sweep, SEAD (suppression of Enemy Air
Defense), Interdiction and Escort. B-2 Mission Payload is the B-57 A/B
Mission Ordnance Penetrator (MOP). (Location of Facilities source: NTI)
Iran Saudi Arabia Iraq UAE Google Nuclear Facilities Kuwait Qatar B-2
Bombers Strike Force Combat Aircraft Strike Force Countering Iran’s Air
Defense Iran’s Current Land Based Air Defense Systems • Iran has
extensive surface-to-air missile assets, but most are obsolete or
obsolescent. Iran’s systems are poorly netted, have significant gaps and
problems in their radar and sensor coverage and modernization, and a
number of its systems are vulnerable to electronic warfare •U.S. never
delivered integrated system before fall of Shah so Iran never had a
fully functioning air defense system. • Iran has made many statements
that it has upgraded and modernized many of the components of such its
Air Defense systems using Russian, Chinese, US, European, and
Iranian-designed and made equipment. But Iran does not have the design
and manufacturing capability to create truly modern system, one that is
immune to electronic warfare, and one that can function without become
tactically vulnerable to antiradiation weapons and other forms of active
“suppression of enemy air defense” (SEAD) systems. •Only modern
short-range point defense system is TOR-M. Other short-range systems mix
of older Russian system, SHORADs (Short Range Air Defense), and aging –
possible inactive British and French systems. • Medium to long-range
systems are low capability or obsolescent. Iran has some 150 HAWKS and
IHAWKs do not have capable ECM. Date back to 1960s and 1970s. It claims
to be able to produce its own IHAWK missiles. Has various versions of
SA-2 obsolete. • Radar sensor and battle management/C4I systems have
major limitations. • Regardless of how much Iran states that it has made
progress, it will still be vulnerable to the advanced technology U.S.
combat aircraft as well as the electronic warfare and defense
suppression weapon systems. This will give the U.S. Strike Force the
freedom, if required after the first strike, to conduct a sustained
campaign of strikes over a few days. (Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS) 30
Gulf Land-Based Air Defense Systems in 2008 Country Major SAM Light SAM
AA Gun Bahrain (8) IHAWK (60) RBS-70 (18) FIM 92A Stinger (7) Crotale
(26) Guns (15) Orlikon 35mm (12) L/70 40mm Iran (16/150) IHAWK (3/10)
SA-5 (45) SA-2 Guideline SA-7/14/16 HQ-7 (29) SA-15; Some QW-1 Misaq
(29) TOR-M1; Some HN-5 (30) Rapier; Some FM-80 (Ch Crotale) 15 Tigercat;
Some FIM-92A Stinger (1,700) Guns ZSU-23-4 23mm ZPU-2/4 23mm ZU-23 23mm
M-1939 37mm S-60 57mm Kuwait (4/24) IHAWK Phase III (5) Patriot PAC-2
(6/12) Aspide (48) Starbust 12 Oerlikon 35mm Oman None Blowpipe; (2)
Mistral SP (34) SA-7; (6) Blindfire (20) Javelin; (40) Rapier S713
Martello (26) Guns (4) ZU-23-2 23mm (10) GDF-(x)5 Skyguard 35mm (12)
L-60 40mm Qatar None (10) Blowpipe (12) FIM-92A Stinger (9) Roland II
(24) Mistral (20) SA-7 Saudi Arabia (16/128) IHAWK (4-6/16-24) Patriot
(17/141) Shahine Mobile (2-4/160) PAC-2 Launchers (17) ANA/FPS-117 Radar
(73/68) Crotale Shahine (40) Crotale (500) Stinger (ARMY) (500) Mistral
(ADF) (500) FIM-43 Redeye (ARMY) (500) Redeye (ADF) (73-141) Shahine
Static (500) FIM-92A Stinger (ARMY) (400) FIM-92A Avenger (ADF) (1,220)
Guns (92) M-163 Vulcan 20mm (30) N-167 Vulcan 20mm (NG) (850) AMX-30SA
30mm (128) GDF Orlikon 35mm (150) L-70 40mm (store) (130) M-2 90mm (NG)
UAE (2/31) IHAWK 20+ Blowpipe (20) Mistral Some Rapier/Crotale/
RB-70/Javelin/SA- 18 (62) Guns (42) M-3VDA 20mm SP (20) GCF-BM2 30mm
(Source: Iranian Weapons of Mass Destruction. Anthony Cordesman CSIS) 31
Air Defense System Associated Early Warning/Acquisition Radars
Associated Tracking & Guidance Radars Missile Ranges (km) Altitude (ft)
In Service Date SA-2 Spoon Rest D (P-18) Flat Face A (P-15) Fansong A/B
Max (km): 40 Min (km) : 8 Altitude (ft): 3,000 to 90,000 1971 Upgraded
SA-3 Flat Face B (P-19) Squat Eye Low Blow Max (km) : 30 Min (km) : 6
Altitude (ft): 150 to 160,000 1971 SA-6 Long Track (P-40) Height Finder:
Thin Skin B (PRV-9) Straight Flush Max (km): 24 Min (km) : 4 Altitude
(ft): 50 to 45,000 1973 SA-8 Flat Face B (P-19) Long Track (P-40) Height
Finder: Thin Skin B (PRV-9) Land Roll Max (km) : 15 Min (km) : 0.2
Altitude (ft): 40 to 40,000 1982 SA-5 Back Trap (P-80) Tall King C
(P-14) Spoon Rest D (P-18) Height Finder: Odd pair (PRV-13) Odd Group
(PRV-16) Square Pair Max (km) : 250 Min (km) : 20 Altitude (ft): 1,500
to 130,000 1983 IHAWK AN/MPQ-50 AN/MPQ-55(PIP II)/62 (PIP III) Range
only Radar AN/MPQ-57 (PIP II)/61 (PIP III) Max (km): 35 Min (km): 3
Altitude (ft): 0 to 55,000 ft 1971 Patriot PAC-2 AN/MPQ-53 Phased-Array
Radar Carries out Search, target detection, track and identification,
missile tracking and ECCM functions AN/MSQ-104 Engagement Control
Station (ECS) Max (km): 70 Min (km): 3 Altitude (ft): 80,000 1990 Medium
to Long Range Surface To Air Missile Systems 32 (Source: Iranian Weapons
of Mass Destruction. Anthony Cordesman CSIS) GCC vs Iranian Airforce
Comparison • Iran’s most advanced fighters consist of a small number of
export versions of the Su-24 and MiG-29, whose avionics lag far behind
their Russian counterparts. It is reported that Iran has less than 30
export versions of MiG-29, some not operational. These limits to Iran’s
air force are particularly important as Iran has air bases that are only
a few minutes flight time from critical targets in the Gulf and in the
coastal areas of the southern Gulf states. They are also important
because Iran’s weaknesses in air-to-air combat, and its weaknesses in
surface-to-air missile defense which are described shortly, leave it
highly vulnerable to any US attack. • Iran claims to have modernized the
avionics on some of these aircraft, and to have adapted its F-14s to
carry the Hawk air-to-surface missile as a long-range air-to-air missile
to compensate for the fact its F-14s were sabotaged during the fall of
the Shah and cannot make effective use of Phoenix missiles – which in
any case are long beyond their useful life. It also claims to have
created electronic warfare aircraft and to have modernized the avionics
on its 3 PF-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft – which are as close to an
AWACs/airborne warning and control aircraft as Iran has. It also has
claimed to have a mix of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs and UAVs)
it can use to make up for some of the limitation in its aircraft. • The
GCC have been planning their defenses so as to provide a military
deterrent sufficient to make any direct confrontation as costly as
possible to Iran or any other adversary. It is in this deterrent role
that lies the ultimate rationale for any GCC Joint Defense Pact and
Cooperation. • Two main considerations underlying the choice of a
Military Doctrine by the GCC states have been: Balance of Forces and
Strategic Depth. In particular for the Arabian Gulf “front line states”
Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE and Oman, the main concern would be
strategic depth to an Iranian attack. (Source: Anthony Cordesman CSIS) •
Defense Performance Criteria should be a 85% Probability that the
defense shoots down all the incoming threat aircraft; this also means an
85% of zero leakage. Furthermore a 90% Probability that incoming are
incoming threat aircraft are successfully detected early and tracked by
the GCC Air Defense. • Lack of Strategic Depth results in limitations on
the area of operational maneuverability during conflict, time to
respond, and an increase in the vulnerability of vital strategic
critical infrastructure economic centers due to the proximity to the
borders. Saudi Arabia is be the only state that has strategic depth, and
is looked upon to play a pivotal role in the Security Arrangements of
the Gulf and the Arab Israeli conflict. Saudi Arabia’s oil resources,
population and strategic depth make it a major and essential participant
in any regional security arrangements or conflict in the Gulf region. •
When transformed into an operational doctrine, the GCC states would base
their Force Structure Planning on: Defensible Borders. Borders which can
be defended without a pre-emptive initiative, and the parallel
capability to take the war to the enemy and to fight on enemy territory.
• The requirement would be to enhance the conventional military ability
for the GCC states consisting of four major components: Force Structure;
Modernization; Readiness; Sustainability. In addition it would include
developing an asymmetric warfare capability. The total GCC Air Power is
428 combat aircraft, in assuming only 75% are operationally ready
(full-mission capable), the total available force will then be 320 and
with a sortie rate of 3 per aircraft per day the total number of sorties
generated would be 960. Whereas for Iran, a total of 158 aircraft with
an operational readiness rate of 60%, the available combat force will be
95, and with 2 sorties per aircraft per day the total sorties generated
will come to 190. The 6:1 ratio of sorties generated projects the
weakness of the Iranian Airforce vs the those of the GCC countries. • By
following the guidelines of the USAF Doctrine manuals in the missions
needed for Offensive Counterair, Defensive Counterair as well as
Counterland Operations, the 6:1 ratio clearly implies that there is a
substantial advantage in favor of the GCC Airforces achieving the
specified wartime objective of winning an air war or destroying a target
Iran Airforce Tactical Fighter Capabilities - 2012 Type No Operational Readiness (%) Force Available Total Sortie Per Day Postulated Employment MiG-29A 25 60 15 30 Air Defense/Escort/FS/BAS Su-25 13 60 8 16 CAS/BI/Deep Strike SU-24 30 60 18 36 CAS/BI/Deep Strike F-14 25 60 15 30 Air Defense/FS F-4E/D 65 69 39 78 CAS/BI/Deep Strike/SEAD Total 158 95 190 BAS: Battlefield Air Superiority CAS: Close Air Support BI: Battlefield Interdiction DS: Defense Suppression FS: Fighter Sweep Sustained Conditions : 12 hr Operational Day 18 hr Maintenance Day 2 Sorties per Aircraft per day 37
Type Order of Battle Operational Ready % Force Available Force Total Sorties per Day Postulated Employment Tornado IDS Saudi Arabia: 25 75 19 57 Deep Strike Typhoon Saudi Arabia: 22 75 16 48 FS, BAS, AD, Escort Mirage 2000 UAE: 62 Qatar: 12 (Total: 74) 75 UAE: 46 Qatar: 9 (Total: 55) UAE: 138 Qatar: 27 (Total: 165) FS, BAS, AD, Escort F-18 Kuwait: 39 75 29 87 FS, BAS, AD, Escort, CAS, BI, SEAD F-16C/D Bahrain: 21 Oman: 12 UAE: 80 (Total: 113) 75 Bahrain: 16 Oman: 9 UAE: 60 (Total: 85) Bahrain: 48 Oman: 27 UAE: 180 (Total: 255) FS,BAS, AD, Escort, CAS, BI F-15C/D Saudi Arabia: 84 75 63 189 FS, BAS, AD, Escort, CAS, BI F-15S Saudi Arabia: 71 75 53 160 Deep Strike, FS, AD, Escort, CAS, BI Total 428 320 960 GCC Airforce Tactical Fighter Capabilities - 2012 Sustained Conditions : 12 hr Operational Day 18 hr Maintenance Day 3 Sorties per aircraft per day FS: Fighter Sweep, BAS: Battlefield Air Superiority, AD: Air Defense, CAS: Close Air Support (Air to Ground Role), BI: Battle Field Interdiction (Air to Ground Role) SEAD: Suppression of Enemy Air Defense 39 40 Defensive Counterair Operations Combat Air Patrol Strip Launched Intercept Mission : Defense of Border from Enemy Intrusion. Objective : Provide Airspace Surveillance over selected corridor and Intercept. Assumptions & Conditions: - Corridor Width & Distance from Base - Threat Operations - Duration of Coverage AWACS Ground Control Intercept Radar (Source: Counterair Operations USAF AFDD 2-1.1 October 1, 2008) Central Factors in Threat Engagement Analysis: • C4I (Command Control Communications Computing and Intelligence) and the maximum Air Defense engagement force • The Operational Readiness of the forces resulting in the combat forces available as Full Mission Capable. • The maximum usable Ground/Strip Launched Interceptor force and Combat Air Patrol operations. The Maximum Strip Launched Interceptors is highly sensitive to the C4I time delay and the response time. • In the Alert Phase of air operations, the combat ready assets are assigned to the Ground Launched Intercept and Combat Air Operations (CAP). Radar Coverage Threat Aircraft Corridor Width Typical GCC Combat Air Patrol Mission Aircraft Required on CAP Stations Number of Aircraft to Support Each CAP Station x = Total Aircraft Required (Number of CAP Stations) x 2 Operational Day 12 hrs (Sortie Rate) x (Loiter Time) (Aircraft Required on CAP) x (Aircraft Required to Support CAP) x = 3 x 2 = 6 x 12/ (3 x 2) = 2 = 6 x 2 = 14 IRAN Qatar UAE OMAN Saudi Arabia CAP CAP CAP Decreasing the Number of Aircraft Required Entails: • Increasing Aircraft Sortie Rate & Time on Station (Loiter Time) • Increasing Aircraft Radar Range & Time on Station (Loiter Time) 42 What Iran lacks in Air Power: The following are some general criteria that would be required for Iran to try and maintain a technological and qualitative edge over the GCC Airforces: • Aircraft: Multi-mission capability. High Operational Readiness/Full Mission Capable state and high sortie rates. All weather day / night operational capability Quick response / ground launched interceptors against incoming intruders. High Endurance. Airborne Electronic Warfare (ESM/ECM/ECCM) survivability Detect track and engage multiple mobile ground targets as well as Hard and Deeply Buried Targets (HDBTs). Rapidly destroy advanced air defense systems. Capable of carrying out deep strike missions. Short C4I Early Warning delay time due to having antiquated System, semi-automated man in the loop, giving rise to long Response / Scramble Time by Combat Aircraft • Air to Air Missiles: Aircraft to be capable of multiple target engagement. Fire and Forget/Launch and leave with high single shot kill capability. Good target discrimination and enhanced resistance to countermeasures. Increase in range of firing missile at the same time shortening the flight time to the target. low Loss Exchange Ratio in a Closing / BVR Environment and Visual Engagement Environment. • •Air to Ground: Weapons that serve as an effective force multiplier. Stand-off capability, operating from ranges outside enemy point defenses. Low and high altitude launches. Preserve crew and aircraft survivability Effective against a wide array of land and sea targets with high single shot kill probability. Weapons that employ launch and leave with high accuracy (small CEP). Capable of day/night and adverse weather conditions Iran’s Missile Forces • There is little disagreement that Iran’s actions pose a potential threat, but there is far less agreement over the nature, scale and timing of this threat. US, European, Gulf, and Israeli policymakers and experts agree that Iran possesses a large and growing missile force, with some missiles capable of hitting Israel, and Europe. They agree that Iran has begun developing longer range and solid-fuel missiles. At the same time, the Iranian program is in flux and many of Iran’s missile systems are still in a development phase where their range, accuracy, warhead, and reliability are impossible to predict. • Iran has been developing ballistic missile capabilities based on Russian, North Korean, and Chinese technology or weapons systems since the early 1980s. Iran currently possesses the largest ballistic missile inventory in the Middle East, and the country’s military and scientific establishments are working to increase the sophistication, scale, and reach of its missiles. • Iran sees its missile capabilities as a way to compensate for its shortcomings in conventional forces, as well as a means to strike at high-value targets with little warning, such as population centers, and Western and Western-backed forces in the region, including US bases in the Gulf. As such, ballistic missiles play an integral role in Iran’s asymmetric warfare doctrine. Given the emphasis Iran places on its missile program, it is clear that Iran considers its ballistic missile arsenal among its most important assets as both a deterrent to attack and leverage over other regional players. • There is no agreement as to when Iran may acquire missiles with homing warheads and the kind of terminal guidance that can hit point targets effectively with conventional warheads. There is no agreement on the reliability and accuracy of Iran’s missiles under operational conditions, there is no agreement on Iran’s ability to deploy systems with countermeasures to missile defenses. There is no agreement on when Iran might deploy a fully function nuclear warhead. And, there is no agreement on the future size, character, and basing mode of Iran’s missile forces once its long-range systems are deployed in strength. Deterrence and Active Defense Risks Iran’s Missile Program (Reference: Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner. CSIS “Iran and the Gulf Military Balance – I and II.) 45 Iran Military Doctrine: • Since Iran presently does not have access to high technology military weapon systems, it will need to develop all ranges of Ballistic Missiles to compensate for its deficiencies in conventional forces. • Iran has no problem in Strategic Depth, can be an advantage fighting in and over familiar territory. Force Structure Planning based on: o High attrition rate inflicted on adversary civilians o In depth defenses, as Iran has the strategic depth Tactical Ballistic Missiles Threat: • Iran’s ballistic missiles cover the complete spectrum range from150 km up to 5,500 km, the Short, Medium, and Intermediate Ranges of Ballistic Missiles. Iran believes that these will compensate for any deficiencies in its Air Power. • Ballistic Missiles can be used with success against Soft Targets, in open areas and cities to inflict maximum human casualties and create terror. In essence what is considered as a major component in Asymmetric Warfare in the form of high civilian casualties. • This arsenal of Ballistic Missiles possessed by Iran has been declared to be for defensive purposes against any foreign invasion, in particular against the U.S. • However, it has become very clear that it is an arsenal that is intended to inflict maximum casualties and damage, in essence a major component for Asymmetric Warfare in the form of high attrition and defenses in depth and to compensate for any deficiencies in its Air Power. SRBM : Short Range Ballistic Missile MRBM : Medium Range Ballistic Missile IRBM : Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile ICBM : Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
( Reference: Theodre Postol, “A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program” May 6, 2009. Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran’s Nuclear And Missile Potential.) ( Reference: Theodre Postol, “A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program” May 6, 2009. Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran’s Nuclear And Missile Potential.) ( Reference: Theodre Postol, “A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program” May 6, 2009. Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran’s Nuclear And Missile Potential.) ( Reference: Theodre Postol, “A Technical Assessment of Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program” May 6, 2009. Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assessment on Iran’s Nuclear And Missile Potential.) Shahab-1 Shahab-2 Shahab-3 Shahab-4 Class: SRBM SRBM MRBM MRBM Range (km): 300 500 1,300 2,000 Payload (kg): 1,100 600 650 1,000 Iran Shahab Ballistic Missiles Range vs Payload IRAN (Reference: Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. BMDR DoD February 2010)
U.S. & GCC Defense against Iranian Ballistic Missiles
Sea Based Air Defenses The U.S. Navy’s Role in Missile Defense Network Role of the U.S. Navy Aegis System: • Will provide an efficient and highly mobile sea-based defense against Short and Medium – Range Ballistic Missiles in their midcourse phase. • The system will allow the BMD Command to move its defense capabilities close to the enemy sites. • The system will have the Engagement & Long Range Tracking Capability • Intercepting Short to Medium Range Ballistic Missiles in the midcourse phase of the flight with Standard Missile – 3. • Serves as a forward deployed sensor, providing early warning and long range search & track capabilities for ICBMs and IRBMs. Contributions: •Will extend the battle space of the BMDs and contribute to an integrated layered defense. The Naval Aegis system extends the range of the Ground Missile defense (GMD) element by providing reliable track data used to calculate firing solutions. • Aegis BMD will coordinate engagements of short and medium range ballistic missiles with terminal missile defense systems. • As tracking information is shared among these systems, the BMDS will have the opportunity to follow the engagement of a target during the midcourse segment with coordinated terminal engagements. Sea Based Radar Sea Based Radar Aegis Ballistic Missile 3 (Source: Missile Defense Agency. (MDA) Department of Defense. “Testing Building Confidence”, 2009 ) 58 Country TBMD System UAE • The UAE is so far the first GCC country to buy the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) missile system. • On Dec 31, 2011 Pentagon announced that the UAE will be buying 2 full THAAD batteries, 96 missiles, 2 Raytheon AN/TPY-2 radars, and 30 years of spare parts. Total Value $3.34 billion. • In 2008 the UAE ordered Patriot PAC-3: 10 fire units, 172 missiles, First delivery 2009. Kuwait July 2012, Pentagon informed Congress of a plan to sell Kuwait $4.2 billion in weapon systems, including 60 PAC-3 missiles, 20 launching platforms and 4 radars. This will be in addition to the 350 Patriot missiles bought between 2007 and 2010. In 1992, Kuwait bought 210 of the earlier generation Patriots and 25 launchers. Kuwait bought a further 140 more in 2007. Saudi Arabia In 2011 Saudi Arabia signed a $1.7 billion US contract to upgrade it’s Patriot anti-missile system. Qatar The U.S. is building a Missile Warning Facility in Qatar that would utilize an AN/TPY-2-X Band Radar. (Source: Anthony Cordesman and Alexander Wilner, “Iran and the Gulf Military Balance -1” July 11, 2012) Two Tier Theater Ballistic Missile Defense (TBMD) – THAAD & PAC 3 Endo and Exo-Atmospheric Engagements using Shoot-Look-Shoot Hit-to-Kill THAAD Launcher PAC-3 Launcher Upper Tier 1st Intercept Upper Tier 2nd Intercept Shoot-Look-Shoot Lower Tier 1st Intercept Lower Tier 2nd Intercept UAE Qatar IRAN Saudi Arabia TBMD System Defense against THAAD : UAE SRBMs (<1000 km) and MRBMs (1000 - 3000 km) PAC-3 : UAE, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia SRBMs (300 – 1000 km) Missile Launch Arabian Gulf Shoot-Look-Shoot Qatar: Missile Early Warning Radar Mid-Course Phase Need to destroy as many Missile Launchers as possible, pre-boost phase, in order to reduce number of incoming warheads. • Defense Performance Criteria: 85% Probability that the defense shoots down all the incoming missiles (warheads); 85% of zero leakage. • 99% Probability that incoming missiles (warheads) are successfully tracked by the defense. Probability that an incoming missile (warhead) is destroyed Number of shots that must be taken at each incoming missile (warhead) to achieve the defense performance criteria. Defense Required to meet Performance Criteria Destroying as many Ballistic Missile Launchers during (boost Phase) or before Launch: • Decreases the number of incoming missiles (warheads) and also • Decreases number of shots defense needs to take at each Incoming warhead. THEATER BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM, C4ISR & BATTLEFIELD MANAGEMENT. • The Challenge for the GCC States is to design an effective multi-layered Theater Ballistic Missile Defense System (TBMDS) to counter the Short, Medium and Intermediate Ballistic Missiles. • Due to the very short time window in the defense against Ballistic Missiles, they will have to be engaged automatically, which requires intercept authorization and rules of engagement to be agreed upon in advance. All part of an effective C4ISR / BM system in both peace time and war. This will also act as a Force Multiplier. • Evident that the key to an effective TBMD lies in regional cooperation, which can take a range of forms from coordination and cooperation between command centers and defense systems for TBMD purposes - while enabling each state to control its own defenses. • Cooperation to be comprehensive in nature, leading to a near-real time situation awareness of the military developments in the area, hostile and friendly military capabilities and their operational levels. This would also be in the form of cooperation into TBMDs and NBC threat assessment. This requires an C4ISR capability in all its Components, such as, Unmanned Air Systems (UAS’s) / Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAV’s). • As the Front Lines of a Missile War will be over the Arabian Gulf region, the a Multi-Tier TBMD systems will play the leading role in Air Defenses and in a Theater Ballistic Missile Defense Network. Sea based systems will provide an efficient and highly mobile defense against Theater Ballistic Missiles. • The Naval System, such as the U.S. Navy Aegis system, will allow the TBMD command to move its defense capabilities close to the enemy sites and serve as a forward deployed sensor and will have the Long Range Engagement and Tracking Capability. This will extend the battle space of the BMDs and contribute to an integrated layered defense. 62 PAC-3 THAAD Early Warning Radar AWACS Air Defense Sea-Based EW & Terminal Defense Midcourse & Terminal Missile Defense Early Warning & Long Range Search & Track Capabilities against Iranian MRBMs Ballistic Missile War Between Iran the U.S. and the Gulf States Iranian Shahab 3 Launched against Israel UAE OMAN Gulf of Oman IRAQ IRAN SAUDI-ARABIA KUWAIT QATAR BAHRAIN Defense Support Program in Boost Phase Space Sensor 63 Countering Iranian attacks on the Straits of Hormuz The IMF in a report “World Economic Outlook (update) January 24, 2012,” summarized the global financial situation as follows: • Concerns about geopolitical oil supply risks are increasing again. The oil market impact of intensified concerns about an Iran-related oil supply shock (or an actual disruption) would be large, given limited inventory and spare capacity buffers, as well as the still-tight physical market conditions expected throughout 2012.” • On January 25, 2012, In a regular note to the Group of 20 leading industrialized countries, the IMF said that “if Iran goes ahead with a threat to blockade oil exports via the Straits of Hormuz in the Gulf, the shock could be even greater. A blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would constitute, and be perceived by markets to presage, sharply heightened global geopolitical tension involving a much larger and unprecedented disruption." Effects of Oil Price Spikes: • Sharp and/or sustained oil price increases place further pressures on highly oil-dependent industries and consumers, as well as raising geopolitical tensions. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), a sustained US$ 10/barrel increase in the price of oil could lower growth of global GDP by 0.5 percentage points (pct pts) in the subsequent year. • In addition to adverse impacts for growth effects, substantially higher oil prices generate current account surpluses in producing countries, which may exacerbate global macroeconomic imbalances and fuel financial market turbulence. 65
Mediterranean Sea •The Suez Canal/Sumed Pipeline: • Oil Flow: 4.5 million bbl/d •The Strait of Hormuz: • Oil Flow: 16.5 million bbl/d •Bab el-Mandab: • Oil Flow: 3.3 million bbl/d Oil Transit Chokepoints • The volume of Gulf oil exports amounts to some 20% of all the world’s oil production of 87 million barrels a day. Any major disruption affects the entire economy of Asia and all world oil prices – regardless of where oil is produced. It can lead to panic and hoarding on a global basis and the US economy will be no more exempt to the resulting rise in energy prices and the global impact on limited exports to the US and other major industrial and trading states on than any other major economic power. US and other energy importer energy independence may happen someday, but today it is foolish, dangerous myth. • Virtually all of the Gulf’s oil must pass through the Gulf, the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, and the Arabian Sea – and then through the Indian Ocean. Gulf oil production and loading facilities, and tanker traffic can be attacked anywhere in the Gulf. Iran can use a mix of mines, submarines, submersibles, drones, anti-ship missiles, small craft, and assault forces anywhere in the Gulf region to threaten the flow of oil exports. • Iran can cherry pick its targets in an effort to pressure and intimidate the US and Southern Gulf states. It can use long-range conventionally armed missiles or drones against large military or urban targets as terror weapons. It can attack sporadically and unpredictably in a war of attrition or attempt to “swarm” US and Gulf naval forces.). Global Importance of Gulf Energy Exports (Source: EIA/DOE, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2. cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c . 69 • At its narrowest point, the Strait is 21 miles wide, but the width of the shipping lane in either direction is only two miles, separated by a two-mile buffer zone. The Strait is deep and wide enough to handle the world's largest crude oil tankers, with about two-thirds of oil shipments carried by tankers in excess of 150,000 deadweight tons. • Flows through the Strait in 2011 were roughly 35 percent of all seaborne traded oil, or almost 20 percent of oil traded worldwide. More than 85 percent of these crude oil exports went to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China representing the largest destinations. • In addition, Qatar exports about 2 trillion cubic feet per year of liquefied natural gas (LNG) through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for almost 20 percent of global LNG trade. Furthermore, Kuwait imports LNG volumes that travel northward through the Strait of Hormuz. These flows totaled about 100 billion cubic feet per year in 2010. Strait of Hormuz 70 (Source: EIA/DOE, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2. cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c . Source: EIA/DOE, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2. cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c . Volume of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Transported Through World Chokepoints, 2007-2011 in Millions of Barrels Per Day 71 Most potential options to bypass Hormuz are currently not operational. Only Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) presently have pipelines able to ship crude oil outside of the Gulf, and only the latter two countries currently have additional pipeline capacity to circumvent Hormuz. At the start of 2012, the total available pipeline capacity from the two countries combined, which is not utilized, was approximately 1 million bbl/d. The amount could potentially increase to 4.3 million bbl/d by the end of this year, as both countries have recently completed steps to increase standby pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait. Iraq has one major crude oil pipeline, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan (Iraq-Turkey) Pipeline that transports oil from the north of Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan. This pipeline pumped about 0.4 million bbl/d in 2011, far below its nameplate capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d and it has been the target of sabotage attacks. Moreover, this pipeline cannot send additional volumes to bypass the Strait of Hormuz unless it receives oil from southern Iraq via the Strategic Pipeline, which links northern and southern Iraq. Currently, portions of the Strategic Pipeline are closed, and renovations to the Strategic Pipeline could take several years to complete. Saudi Arabia has the 745-mile-long Petroline, also known as the East-West Pipeline, which runs from across Saudi Arabia from its Abqaiq complex to the Red Sea. The Petroline system consists of two pipelines with a total nameplate capacity of about 4.8 million bbl/d. The 56-inch pipeline has a nameplate capacity of 3 million bbl/d and its current throughput is about 2 million bbl/d. The 48-inch pipeline had been operating in recent years as a natural gas pipeline, but Saudi Arabia. recently converted it back to an oil pipeline. The switch could increase Saudi Arabia's spare oil pipeline capacity to bypass the Strait of Hormuz from 1 million bbl/d to 2.8 million bbl/d, which is only attainable if the system is able to operate at its full nameplate capacity. Alternative Routes to the Strait of Hormuz 72 Source: EIA/DOE, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2. cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c . The UAE constructed a 1.5 million bbl/d Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline that runs from Habshan, a collection point for Abu Dhabi's onshore oil fields, to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman, allowing crude oil shipments to circumvent Hormuz. The pipeline was recently opened and the first shipment of 500,000 barrels of oil was sent through the pipeline to the Fujairah oil terminal where it was loaded on a tanker and sent to the Pak-Arab Refinery in Pakistan. The pipeline will be able to export up to 1.5 million bb/d, or more than half of UAE's total net oil exports, once it reaches full operational capacity in the near future. However, the UAE does not currently have the ability to utilize this pipeline completely, until it ramps to full capacity. In late May, Fujairah ruler Sheikh Hamad bin Mohammed Al-Sharqi noted that this pipeline capacity could rise further to a maximum 1.8 million bbl/d. Saudi Arabia also has two additional pipelines that run parallel to the Petroline system and bypass the Strait of Hormuz, but neither of them have the ability to transport additional volumes of oil should the Strait of Hormuz be closed. The Abqaiq-Yanbu natural gas liquids pipeline has a capacity of 290,000 bbl/d and is running at capacity. The IPSA (Iraqi Pipeline through Saudi Arabia) is used to transport natural gas to Saudi Arabia's western coast. It was originally built to carry 1.65 million bbl/d of crude oil from Iraq to the Red Sea, but Saudi Arabia later converted it to carry natural gas, and has not announced plans to convert it back to transport crude oil. Other pipelines, such as the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (TAPLINE) running from Qaisumah in Saudi Arabia to Sidon in Lebanon, have been out of service for years due to war damage, disuse, or political disagreements, and would require a complete renovation before being usable. Relatively small quantities, several hundred thousand barrels per day at most, could be trucked to mitigate closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Alternative Routes to the Strait of Hormuz - 2 73 Currently Operable Crude Oil Pipelines that Bypass the Strait of Hormuz: If war should come while surplus pipeline capacity is still limited to the high EIA estimate of 4.3 million barrels a day – and all pipeline loading and other facilities remained secure from attack -- this would only provide 25% percent of the 17 million barrels a day flowing through the Gulf. 74 Notes: All estimates are EIA estimates as of August 17, 2012 and expressed in million barrels per day (bbl/d). 1 Although the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline has a nominal nameplate capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d, its effective capacity is 0.4 million bbl/d because it cannot transport additional volumes of oil until the Strategic Pipeline to which it links can be repaired to bring in additional volumes of oil from the south of Iraq. 2 "Unused Capacity" is defined as pipeline capacity that is not currently utilized and can be readily available. 3 All estimates for 2012 are rates around the mid-year point; not the forecast average for 2012. 4 The 2012 throughput rates are based off of 2011 estimates. Source: EIA/DOE, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2. cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c . Currently Operable Crude Oil Pipelines that Bypass the Strait of Hormuz: If war should come while surplus pipeline capacity is still limited to the high EIA estimate of 4.3 million barrels a day – and all pipeline loading and other facilities remained secure from attack -- this would only provide 25% percent of the 17 million barrels a day flowing through the Gulf. 75 Notes: All estimates are EIA estimates as of August 17, 2012 and expressed in million barrels per day (bbl/d). 1 Although the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Pipeline has a nominal nameplate capacity of 1.6 million bbl/d, its effective capacity is 0.4 million bbl/d because it cannot transport additional volumes of oil until the Strategic Pipeline to which it links can be repaired to bring in additional volumes of oil from the south of Iraq. 2 "Unused Capacity" is defined as pipeline capacity that is not currently utilized and can be readily available. 3 All estimates for 2012 are rates around the mid-year point; not the forecast average for 2012. 4 The 2012 throughput rates are based off of 2011 estimates. Source: EIA/DOE, World Oil Transit Chokepoints, August 2012, http://www.eia.gov/countries/regionstopics2. cfm?fips=WOTC&trk=c . (Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/Persian_Gulf/images/pg_map.pdf) Overland Oil Supply Pipelines 76
Key Targets that Illustrate Iran’s Vulnerability 79 • Critical dependence on refineries with high cost, long lead facilities and on imports of product. • Minimal power grid that can be crippled or destroyed selectively on a regional or national basis. • Gas production and distribution facilities needed by Iran’s domestic economy. • Key bridges, tunnels, overpasses and mountain routes for road and rail traffic. • Gulf tanker loading facilities, oil storage and and tanker terminals – for mining or direct attack. • Key military production facilities • Command and control centers. • Communications grids. • Airfield and air bases. • IRGC land, air, and naval facilities. • Coastal naval bases and port facilities.
Israeli Preventive Strike Options Scenario I: Israeli Airforce Combat Aircraft 81 Israeli Strike: • It is possible that Israel will carry out a strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, if the U.S. does not, with the objective of either destroying the program or delaying it for some years. The success of the Strike Mission will be measured by how much of the Enrichment program has it destroyed, or the number of years it has delayed Iranian acquisition of enough Uranium or Plutonium from the Arak reactor to build a nuclear bomb. • We conclude that a military strike by Israel against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is possible and the optimum route would be along the Syrian-Turkish border then over a small portion of Iraq then into Iran, and back the same route. However, the number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to the targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate. • The U.S. would certainly be perceived as being a part of the conspiracy and having assisted and given Israel the green light, whether it did or had no part in it whatsoever. This would undermine the U.S. objectives in increasing stability in the region and bringing about a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It will also harm for a very long period of time relations between the U.S. and its close regional allies. • Another scenario is in using Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons as a substitute for conventional weapons to attack deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran. Some believe that these are the only weapons that can destroy targets deep underground or in tunnels. • The U.S. would not allow any other country, even a strong ally such as Israel, to use them, unless another country had used nuclear weapons against the U.S. and its allies. • A strike by Israel on Iran will give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism. The regional security consequences will be catastrophic. Iranian Counter Vulnerabilities: • It is possible that Israel will carry out a strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities, if the U.S. does not, with the objective of either destroying the program or delaying it for some years. The success of the Strike Mission will be measured by how much of the Enrichment program has it destroyed, or the number of years it has delayed Iranian acquisition of enough Uranium or Plutonium from the Arak reactor to build a nuclear bomb. • We conclude that a military strike by Israel against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is possible and the optimum route would be along the Syrian-Turkish border then over a small portion of Iraq then into Iran, and back the same route. However, the number of aircraft required, refueling along the way and getting to the targets without being detected or intercepted would be complex and high risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate. • The U.S. would certainly be perceived as being a part of the conspiracy and having assisted and given Israel the green light, whether it did or had no part in it whatsoever. This would undermine the U.S. objectives in increasing stability in the region and bringing about a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It will also harm for a very long period of time relations between the U.S. and its close regional allies. • Another scenario is in using Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons as a substitute for conventional weapons to attack deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran. Some believe that these are the only weapons that can destroy targets deep underground or in tunnels. • The U.S. would not allow any other country, even a strong ally such as Israel, to use them, unless another country had used nuclear weapons against the U.S. and its allies. • A strike by Israel on Iran will give rise to regional instability and conflict as well as terrorism. The regional security consequences will be catastrophic. 84 Central Route Southern Route Northern Route ARAK: Heavy Water Plant and Future Plutonium Production Reactor (5,500 sq m) Natanz: Uranium Enrichment Facility (65,000 sq m) Esfahan: Nuclear Research Center. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF). (10,000 sq m) Qum: Enrichment Facility with Tunnel Entrances Syria Iraq Iran Saudi Arabia Jordan Turkey Caspian Sea Israeli Strike against Iranian Nuclear Facilities Main Target Set Tehran Bushehr: 1000 MW Nuclear Power Plant 85 86 (250 nmi) from North of Israel (440 nmi) (420 nmi) To Esfahan Mission Analysis: Approximate range to the furthest target Esfahan is some 1,110 nmi. When approaching the 550 nmi range, the F-15Es and F-16Is need to refuel on the way to Iran and on the way back. Refueling can be done in three ways: o Refueling from KC-135A and KC-10 tankers. o Buddy Refueling between F-15Es and F-16Is o A temporary landing strip, along the Syrian, Turkish and Northern Iraq region, where aircraft refueling is available. Total Fuel in an F-15E for the Hi-Lo-Lo-Hi strike mission is 26,300 lbs, whereas that for an F-16I is about 14,755 lbs. The total maximum strike package was around 80 aircraft, all the 30 F-15I in the Israeli Airforce Inventory plus 55 F-16I/C. The F-15E would then need 5 to 6 KC-130s to refuel from, and the F-16Is would require 6 to 7 KC-130. Israel presently has 5 KC-130H and 4 B-700 (Source IISS). So all the Israeli Tankers will have to be airborne to service the F-15E and F-16I Strike Force during the outbound leg and inbound legs of the mission. Could be difficult to find a location along the route such that the tankers could avoid detection and possible interception. These estimates were done assuming a 100% aircraft and weapons operational reliability and the strike force not encountering any Iranian Air and Ground Defense. So if we give the overall reliability to be 90% then we should add around 9 to 10 more aircraft, bringing the total strike force to 95. So in essence over 25% of the high end combat aircraft of Israeli Airforce and 100% of the Tankers will have to be allocated for this mission. 87 • One strike would not necessarily be enough to achieve the mission objectives. Strike aircraft need to return for another strike. This would put a heavy burden on the Israeli Airforce. • We can conclude that a military strike by the Israeli Airforce against Iranian Nuclear Facilities is possible, however, it would be complex and high risk in the operational level and would lack any assurances of a high mission success rate. • Iranian retaliation will have a devastating regional consequences. U.S. expects Israel to be responsible and not to carry out such a strike. • Air to ground strike mission can be difficult to implement and would involve some risks. Flying on a very tight route, practically hugging the Turkish-Syrian borders. Aerial refueling along the way and avoid being detected by Turkey, Syria and the U.S. Flying down to S/L when in Iranian territory, avoid being detected by flying low and applying ECM all the way. If detected by Iranian air defense the strike formation should be prepared to encounter interceptors, and to encountering firing of ground based SAMs. 88 Israeli Preventive Strike Options Scenario II: Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons 89 • Another scenario is using these warheads as a substitute for conventional weapons to attack deeply buried nuclear facilities in Iran. Some believe that nuclear weapons are the only weapons that can destroy targets deep underground or in tunnels. • The gun-type Uranium based nuclear bomb dropped on Hiroshima by the U.S. in August of 1945 was about 8,000 pounds in weight, and contained about 60 kg of weapons grade Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), of which about 0.7 kg underwent fission producing a Yield of 12.5 kilotons. The Plutonium implosion bomb dropped on Negasaki weighed about 10,800 pounds and contained about 6.4 kg of weapons-grade Plutonium PU-239. Producing a yield of 22 kilotons. in the subsequent years the U.S. was able to produce Plutonium-implosion nuclear bombs in the same yield range with weights down to 2,000 lbs and less. • If Ballistic Missiles are used to carry out the mission, Israel has have a Ballistic Missile Defense System whereas Iran does not have one, such as the Russian S-300PMU2 “Favorit”, that was designed to intercept ballistic missiles as well as combat aircraft. Low Yield Earth Penetrating Nuclear Weapons • 90
US Simulations of the Consequences of an Israeli Strike 92 • A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials. • The officials said the so-called war game was not designed as a rehearsal for American military action — and they emphasized that the exercise’s results were not the only possible outcome of a real-world conflict. • But the game has raised fears among top American planners that it may be impossible to preclude American involvement in any escalating confrontation with Iran, the officials said. In the debate among policy makers over the consequences of any Israeli attack, that reaction may give stronger voice to those in the White House, Pentagon and intelligence community who have warned that a strike could prove perilous for the United States. • The results of the war game were particularly troubling to Gen. James N. Mattis, who commands all American forces in the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Southwest Asia, according to officials who either participated in the Central Command exercise or who were briefed on the results and spoke on condition of anonymity because of its classified nature. When the exercise had concluded earlier this month, according to the officials, General Mattis told aides that an Israeli first strike would be likely to have dire consequences across the region and for United States forces there. • The two-week war game, called Internal Look, played out a narrative in which the United States found it was pulled into the conflict after Iranian missiles struck a Navy warship in the Persian Gulf, killing about 200 Americans, according to officials with knowledge of the exercise. The United States then retaliated by carrying out its own strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The New York Times, March 19, 2012 “U.S. War Games Sees Perils of Israeli Strike Against Iran” 93 • The initial Israeli attack was assessed to have set back the Iranian nuclear program by roughly a year, and the subsequent American strikes did not slow the Iranian nuclear program by more than an additional two years. However, other Pentagon planners have said that America’s arsenal of long-range bombers, refueling aircraft and precision missiles could do far more damage to the Iranian nuclear program — if President Obama were to decide on a full-scale retaliation. • The exercise was designed specifically to test internal military communications and coordination among battle staffs in the Pentagon; in Tampa, Fla., where the headquarters of the Central Command is located; and in the Persian Gulf in the aftermath of an Israeli strike. But the exercise was written to assess a pressing, potential, real-world situation. In the end, the war game reinforced to military officials the unpredictable and uncontrollable nature of a strike by Israel, and a counterstrike by Iran, the officials said. • American and Israeli intelligence services broadly agree on the progress Iran has made to enrich uranium. But they disagree on how much time there would be to prevent Iran from building a weapon if leaders in Tehran decided to go ahead with one. • With the Israelis saying publicly that the window to prevent Iran from building a nuclear bomb is closing, American officials see an Israeli attack on Iran within the next year as a possibility. They have said privately that they believe that Israel would probably give the United States little or no warning should Israeli officials make the decision to strike Iranian nuclear sites. • Officials said that, under the chain of events in the war game, Iran believed that Israel and the United States were partners in any strike against Iranian nuclear sites and therefore considered American military forces in the Persian Gulf as complicit in the attack. Iranian jets chased Israeli warplanes after the attack, and Iranians launched missiles at an American warship in the Persian Gulf, viewed as an act of war that allowed an American retaliation. 94 Appendix GBU-27 BLU-109 2000lb class penetrating warhead. Penetrates 1.8 to 2.4 meters of concrete/hard targets depending on angle of attach. It carries 550 lbs of high explosives, and can penetrate more than 6 feet of reinforced concrete. This 2000lb weapon would be most likely used against the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. In addition the GBU-10 can also be used. GBU-28 BLU-113 5000 lb class penetrating warhead. Penetrates at least 6 meters (20 feet) of concrete, presumably reinforced concrete and 30 meters(100 ft) of earth. It is a 5,000 lb laser guided conventional munitions that uses a 4,000 lb penetrating warhead blast/fragmentation, which contains 630 pounds of explosive. The GBU-28/BLU-113 5000lb penetrator would be the most likely weapon of choice against the Natanz Centrifuge Facility as well as the Esfahan Uranium Conversion Facility. Used as a Bunker Buster. 2 properly sequenced GBU’s would most certainly penetrate the 30 meters of earth and up to 6m of concrete. The Probability of Hit (PH) of 2 GBU’s aimed at the same point essentially one following the other is 50%. Mission Planning Payloads 96 Weapon Warhead (kg) 10 psi (ft) 5 psi (ft) 3 psi (ft) GBU-28 306 62 92 125 GBU-27 240 59 89 118 GB-10 428 69 105 144 Peak Overpressure Distance Target Damage Probability Estimates We present the destructive capabilities of various nuclear weapons: Surface Bursts or Contact Bursts at the ground surface Those that burst after penetrating the surface • The above shows that the Earth Penetrator Weapon (EPW) needs to be of sufficient yield to be effective against targets of interest. For deeply buried targets, an EPW is more effective than a contact burst (surface burst) of the same yield. The probability of damage for a 300kt EPW at 3 meters Depth of Blast (DOB) is equivalent to that for a 5 to 6 Megaton Surface Burst of the same accuracy. • In general, for deeply buried targets, an EPW yields in the range of several hundreds of kilotons to a Megaton are needed to effectively hold these targets of interest at risk with a high probability of destruction. (Source: Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons. National Research Council. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html) 97 • Earth Penetrator Weapon (EPW) at 3 meters depth of burst with 100 meters CEP accuracy, against a deeply buried target. • For a fixed CEP, effectiveness is not strongly dependent on target hardness. • Earth Penetrator Weapon (EPW) at 3 meters depth of burst with 10 meters CEP accuracy, against a deeply buried target. • For a fixed CEP, effectiveness is not strongly dependent on target hardness. (Source: Effects of Nuclear Earth-Penetrator and Other Weapons. National Research Council. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11282.html)
|Iran regime change, Campbridge Energy Research Association, Slade Gorton, General Electric, Jerry Falwell, Lockheed Martin, Northrup Grumann, Jeff Gannon, Bill Bennet, Hillary Clinton, Anglo-Dutch Shell, COP, CVX, Center for Global Oil Energy Studies, Energy Central, Energy Intelligence Group, Bill Clinton, Douglas Bandow, Maggie Gallagher, Karen Hughes, International Petroleum Exchange, NERC, Science Applications International, Caci, Booz, Sy Coleman, Lincoln Alliance Corporation, Iraqex, Bill Frist, Ken Mehlman, Tom DeLay, Oxford Energy Group, Ariel Sharon, Olmert, Platts Global Energy, Schlumberger, US-Saudi Business Organization, US State Department, FBI, Exxon, Joseph Nacchio, Qwest, Forbes, ABC, NBC, CNN, Fox, Richard Mellon Scaife, Nuclear Systems Initiative, Mel Gibson, Howard Ahmanson, Diebold, Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, John M. Olin Foundation, Sarah Scaife Foundation, Chevron, BP Amoco, Royal Dutch Shell, Institute for Religion and Democracy, Christian Right, Evangelical Christians, Answers in Genesis, Acton Institute, Institute on Energy, Hudson Institute, 9/11 Commission, Preston Gates & Ellis, US Dept of Justice, Andrew Card, Clairmont Institute, Bob Jones University, Moonies, Neocons, Neo-cons, Monsanto, Access Research Network, World Energy Council, NPRA, Advocates International, Agape Press, NERV, Southern Baptist Convention, Richard Land, Christian Coalition, Federal Reserve, Allan Greenspan, Christian News Today, Maranatha Journal, Thomas Moore Law Center, Seattle City Club, American Enterprise Institute, Wal-Mart, Dell Computer, Salomon, Citigroup, New York Times, Council for National Policy, Bruce Chapman, Stephen Meyer, Mark Ryland, Tom Alberg, William Baldwin, Christopher T Bayley, Robert Cihak, Robert J. Herbold, William Gates, Sr, Jr. Michael D. Martin, Robert Nuber Mariana Parks, James Spady, Michel K. Vaska, George Gilder, Hance Haney, Vencent Phillip Munoz, Wesley J. Smith, Bret Swanson, William Tucker, John G. West, John Wohlstetter, Patricia Lines, Edwin Meese, Richard Rahn, Meyrav Wurmser, A Clean Break, JINSA, Weyerhauser, Lincoln Group, Philip Johnson, Perkins & Coie, AIPAC, Biola University, Boundless, CBN, Center for Science and Culture, Calvin College, Regent University, Boehner, Illustra Media, Leadership University, Golspelcom.net, Heritage Institute, Northwest Creation Net, MEMRI, Mike Scanlon, Creative Response Concepts, Seattle Weekly, Daniel Lapin, Rick Santorum, David Safavian, Jeb Bush, Cato Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Free Market, Carlyle Group, Frank Carluzzi, John Miller, John Leyman, Roundation for Thought and Ethics, Zoellick Wilkie Farr & Gallagher, Christian Reconstructionists, Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, Lonnie Latham, Kansas Board of Education, Israel, WINEP, Michael Vaska, James Spady, Lee Hamilton, Alex Avery, Dennis Avery, Anne Bayefsky, Robert Bork, Christopher Brown, Conrad Black, Jaime Daremblum, Ronald Dworkin, Mary Fitzgerald, Hohn Fone, Hillel Fradkin, Aspen Institute, Roy Blunt, Dennis Hastert, Dana Rohrabacher, Jim Talent, Trent Lott, John Ensign, Robert Ney, Dick Cheney, Grover Norquist, John Dolittle, S.L. Abbott, Larry Abraham, M. Douglas Adkins, Frank Aker, Barbara Alby, John Alderson, Gary Aldrich, Richard V. Allen, Daniel Bl Allison II, Thomas R. Anderson, Sen. John K. Andrews, Jr. Hon. Richard K. Armey, Ben Armstrong, Sen William L. Armstrong, Dr. Larry P Arnnn John Ashbrook, John Ashcroft, UPI, Campus Crusade for Christ, Unification Church, Kurt Weldon, American Petroleum Institute,|
Britain's Jack Straw, France's Philippe Douste-Blazy and Germany's Joschka Fischer want sanctions sept 2005.